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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the occupational choices of women in developing countries.
In Chapter 1, I examine how removing barriers to higher education for women affects
their enrollment, marriage and labor outcomes. In 1992, Pakistan equalized admis-
sions criteria for women and men applying to medical school. I show that the reform
induced a rapid increase in the female proportion of medical graduates. Next, I use
cross-birth cohort variation to show that post-reform women medical graduates were
more motivated to work: they delayed marriage in their 20s and increased labor force
participation in their 20s and 30s. When they married, they matched with higher
earning spouses. I consider four channels of effect and find suggestive evidence in
favor of a treatment effect of the reform. Equalizing admissions criteria especially
induced women from middle class and migrant families to choose work over marriage
in their 20s.
In Chapter 2, I study how an increased proportion of women in medicine affects the
structure of the medical sector and patient care. Post reform, the medical sector was
increasingly feminized, women specialists entered male dominated specialties, and
especially so in urban areas. In the short run, women patients’ experience with preg-
nancy and infant mortality did not change, suggesting that labor force composition
changes take longer to affect downstream outcomes.
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Chapter 3 studies the effect of male-biased labor demand shocks on women’s employ-
ment. I study shocks in the Indonesian mining sector using proprietary mine location
data and instrumenting for mine value with the world price of minerals. Expansions
in the mining industry lead to negligible changes in employment, but higher wages
for women. They cause substantial shifts in individuals’ sector and location of work.
Both women and men move from agriculture to the service and mining sectors, and
women are less likely to work without pay. Mining booms induce movements between
districts, which may allow labor supply to adjust to changes in labor demand. To-
gether, these results imply that shocks to a male dominated industry cause structural
shifts that affect both genders.
vii
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Educational Investments and Marriage
Success: Evidence from Pakistan
1.1 Introduction
Women and men often concentrate in different fields of study, and this separation can
account for up to 15-25% of the gender pay gap (Barone, 2011; Smyth and Steinmetz,
2008). The sorting by sex is exacerbated by admissions based restrictions to women’s
entry, including quotas, higher entry score requirements, and test score manipulation
(Singapore, Straits Times, 2017; Pakistan, BBC News, 2014; China, New York Times,
2017; BBC News, 2018). Institutional constraints can significantly distort labor and
marriage market outcomes. But how does removing constraints impact the benefit of
the education for the affected group?
I examine the impact of removing educational barriers for women on their en-
rollment, marriage and labor force outcomes. I study this in the context of urban
Pakistan, where pior to 1992 a policy rationed women out of medical school in favor
of men. The proportion of women in medical school was capped at 20%. Within this
quota women were required to score 7% more points than men to be admitted. The
policy was changed in 1992, following a court case by a group of women who alleged
they were denied admission to medical school despite scoring higher than several men.
The cap and threshold were deemed discriminatory and unconstitutional, and men
and women granted equal access to medical school thereafter.
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Medical degrees in Pakistan confer large returns in the labor and marriage mar-
kets. Only 0.5% of women are medical graduates, compared to 13% of women who
obtain a non-medical college degree (Labor Force Surveys of Pakistan, 1990-2012).
Female medical graduates not only enjoy high wages, but are also coveted in the
arranged marriage market where they are percieved as smart, self-disciplined and se-
rious minded women (Dawn News, 2014). While the reform could allow more women
into medical school, it could also decrease the economic rents previously enjoyed by
women medical graduates. I exploit the change in policy to examine how the out-
comes and characteristics of medical graduates changed when the entry threshold for
women was lowered and equalized to that for men.
I show first that removing the institutional barrier resulted in a sudden increase
of 10 percentage points in the female proportion of medical graduates, and a steady
increase thereafter. Pre-policy, on average 28% of medical graduates are women1, and
after the policy-change the proportion rises to 55%. A third of the increase occured
in the single year of the policy change. This suggests that the old admissions policy
significantly distorted medical school admissions. Its removal also paved the way for
an increase in the female proportion of medical graduates and of doctors registering
to work in subsequent years.
To explore the effects of the reform I assemble a data set of repeated cross sections
from the Labor Force Surveys of Pakistan (1990-2012), which contain information on
employment, educational attainment and demographic characteristics. Additionally,
I collect data on the universe of doctor registrations from the Pakistan Medical and
Dental Council’s (PMDC) website, which is an administrative body that regulates
medical schools and hospitals. The data provide a census of 246, 000 doctors that
registered to work between 1952-2018, and are useful for understanding variation in
1. It exceeds the 20% cap because of an all female medical school exempt from the old policy,
possibly imperfect compliance, or women having higher graduation rates than men.
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the labor market effects of the policy. Second, I hand collect and digitize 3, 000
matrimonial advertisements placed in a leading Pakistani newspaper between 1980-
2000 by family members seeking spouses for their children. These advertisements
allow me to qualitatively assess changes in the value of women medical graduates in
marriage and accentuate my main results.
I identify the effects of the policy using a differences-in-differences strategy. Ex-
posed (alternatively, "affected") cohorts of women are those who were young enough
to be affected by the policy change, while un-affected cohorts of women had largely
completed their educational decisions by 1992. Since this first difference could be bi-
ased by changing trends among educated women, I use other college educated women
as a reference to remove any trends. The empirical strategy effectively compares the
inequality in outcomes between medical women and other college women between
cohorts that were exposed to the reform and those not exposed. Women with other
college degrees come closest in characteristics to medical graduate women, yet they
did not experience a similar policy change. The main identifying assumption for my
analysis is that medical graduate women and other college women have parallel trends
in outcomes in the absence of a policy change. While I cannot observe the counter-
factual, an absence of pre-trends between the groups provides suggestive evidence in
favor of the parallel trends assumption.
A concern for my identification strategy is that the group of other college women
could also be affected. If some women who would have obtained another college
degree now obtain a medical degree, the differences-in-differences over-estimates the
relative change in outcomes for post-policy change cohorts of medical graduates. I
argue that the effect on other college women is likely to be small, since the number
of medical college graduates is negligible relative to the overall college going female
population. The entire body of women medical graduate post policy change comprise
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2.6% of the population of college going women. This is an upper bound; if 50% of
medical women post-policy had switched, the proportion would be 1% of other college
women. The average change of medical women would therefore be much larger than
for other college women.
My results imply that medical women post-reform had a greater preference for
work over marriage, and also did not experience worse group outcomes. Prior to the
policy change, medical women and other college women have equal average marriage
rates. After the policy change medical women are 16 percentage points less likely to
marry than previous cohorts, and relative to other college women. The decrease is
strongest for younger medical graduates and statistically insignificant for older ones,
suggesting a marriage delay for medical women. The delay is complemented by an
increase in the probability of working, especially for medical graduates in their late
20s and 30s. Overall the likelihood of working increases by 8 percentage points. While
this coefficient is economically meaningful, it is not statistically significant. Medical
graduates in their late 20s and 30s, however, are significantly more likely to work
than cohorts before them. Further, single women work more than married women,
suggesting that marriage delay and work are closely related and jointly determined.
The marriage and labor force participation outcomes collectively highlight how the
policy change shifted medical graduates’ outcomes in two key aspects of their lives.
These results could be driven by medical women receiving fewer marriage offers
than before, even if their relative preference for work and marriage remained the same.
However, two additional pieces of evidence are inconsistent with this hypothesis. The
first is that conditional on marrying, medical women were matching with even richer
spouses than their pre-policy counterparts. Therefore, at least some women were
receiving good marriage offers. Second, post-policy medical graduates earned no
less than before and tended to be from better income backgrounds. Both imply their
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outside options to marriage were at least as good, if not better, than previous medical
cohorts. The fact that these women were from well-off parental backgrounds, earning
no less and marrying richer spouses suggests it was not a lack of marriage options
causing marriage delay, but a higher preference for work over marriage.
Medical women were selected differently post-policy change, as they were admit-
ted to medical school when a lower entry threshold for women was operating. To the
extent that test scores accurately indicate innate ability, the policy change induced
the entry of lower ability women into medical school. A simple Roy (1951) based
framework predicts that post-policy change women be less likely to work because
they are of lower average ability, and is inconsistent with my findings. I augment the
framework to allow for selection along other dimensions, and empirically determine
how women post-reform are selected differently. The data do not provide parental
characteristics for married women, but they do for single women living with their
parents2. To determine characteristics representative of medical graduates overall, I
use two strategies: first, I analyze the parental background of single women aged 25
or less, at which age 70% of medical graduates are unmarried and selection into sin-
glehood is limited. Second, I analyze single and married women together and assume
assortative matching so that married women’s family characteristics are correlated
with their natal family characteristics. My results are qualitatively similar in both
cases.
As alluded to earlier, richer women, and especially those from middle class families,
are increasingly likely to be medical graduates post reform. However, contrary to the
model’s predictions, these women are more likely to work. This is a surprising result
because negative household income effects imply richer individuals work less, all else
equal. Since selection on parental income and ability worsened post reform, I consider
other compensating aspects of family selection: the presence of female favoring gender
2. Only 10 single women in the data do not live with their families.
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norms, professional connections, and being from a migrant family. While none of these
account for the increased entry of women in medical school, I find that certain groups
of women are especially affected by the reform. In particular, middle class women and
women from migrant families have the highest growth in labor force participation and
marriage delay rates. Without these women there are almost no observable changes
among medical graduates.
Migrating families are characterised in the literature as investing strongly in their
children, being aspirational, and making an effort to catch up with the natives (Borjas,
1987; Mobarak et al., 2014, 2017; Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson, 2014; Minns,
2000). In the Pakistani context middle class families are also associated with having
the means and drive to rise in socioeconomic ranks (Ghani, 2014). Women from both
types of families post-reform were possibly delaying marriage and working to catch
up in income and status with the urban elite. Their change in labor and marriage
patterns would be consistent with differential within-group selection, or a positive
treatment effect of attending school with more women and experiencing positive peer
effects (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010; De Grip
and Sauermann, 2012), for example because working with more women is enjoyable.
Using a method developed by Oster (Oster, 2017) I show that the results are not
purely selection driven, and there likely was a treatment effect as well.
Opposite and symmetric effects could be expected for men since only high ability
men remained in medical school while lower ability men were crowded out by women.
The change in outcomes and selection, however, is unique to women. Men experience
almost no parallel changes along either dimension, which suggests that women in
medical school were affected to a greater extent, and also that it was the admissions
policy, and not other changes in the medical field, driving the results.
The reform is important first, from a policy perspective, and second, because of
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the supply shock of women it induced in an elite and rewarding field. Policy makers
could seek to increase the number of women doctors because of evidence that women
prefer consulting women doctors (Waller, 1988), and that women doctors outperform
men doctors in some settings (Yusuke, 2017). My results show that admission policies
impeding women’s entry substantially restrict the number and proportion of women
doctors, and perpetuate their scarcity. Second, changing the admissions policy caused
a supply shock of women in an elite education. But counterintuitively, this did not
harm group outcomes in terms of wages or their marriage matches. Much larger
supply shocks may be required for standard supply and demand forces to operate
and lower medical graduates’ value.
Additionally, my paper contributes to two main strands of literature. First, it
is related to a broad literature on women in higher education (Goldin, 1992, 1997,
1999). One long-standing focus within this literature is to understand the educational
constraints experienced by women, either historically (Harworth et al., 2002; Ekstrom,
1972), or in the modern day (Wasserman, 2017). Although considered a pillar of
economic growth by economists (Sen, 2012; Summers, 1994), women’s education has
also been constrained in developing countries, due in part to poverty and to cultural
features (Jayachandran, 2015). My paper contributes by focusing on an admissions-
based, institutional barrier, which is a well-defined and substantive constraint. As
increasing numbers of women seek college education in the developing world, my
paper highlights the importance of such barriers by quantifying the market distortion
they cause, as well as the effects of their removal.
Another main focus of this literature is the effect of being high skilled on marriage
outcomes for women, for example because high skills signal being ambitious (Bursztyn
et al., 2017), or a negative social attitude about working women persists (Bertrand
et al., 2019). My paper contributes to this literature by highlighting a setting where
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having a specific high skill is documented to send a positive signals of ability and
serious minded-ness on the marriage market, as opposed to an adverse signal of being
ambitious. A key difference may be that married women’s labor force participation
rate is relatively low in this context, regardless of education, and being high skilled
may not be as strongly correlated with the likelihood of working. My results also
suggest that a relative decrease in marriage rates for skilled women can arise if women
delay marriage and work, possibly because they anticipate not working after being
married.
Second, the paper contributes to literature on social mobility. This applies both to
the context of immigrant assimilation (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985; Abramitzky and
Boustan, 2017), and to the role of education in promoting social mobility (Greenstone
et al, 2013). I show that medical graduates from middle class and migrant families
significantly increased their labor force participation after the removal of entry bar-
riers. Working could allow these women to catch up in income and status with their
higher class counterparts. Apart from characterizing the types of women who respond
to the reform, my paper highlights how removing educational constraints can allow
women in a developing country setting to experience upward mobility.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide contextual
background and institutional details. In section 3, I discuss my identification strategy
and relevant data sets, followed by results and robustness checks in section 4. I discuss
mechanisms in 5, and conclude in section 6. The analysis is repeated for men and
presented in the Appendix.
1.2 Background
For a growing Pakistani middle class, medicine is viewed as one of the most rewarding
educational options for women. In the sections below I describe the socio-economic
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context of the study, the importance of medical school, and the policy change.
The Socio-economic Context 40% of the Pakistani population is classified as
urban (World Bank, 2015). A map of the concentration of night lights (figure 1·1)
shows that the urban population is spread over a few large urban centers and several
smaller cities. Urban and semi-urban areas have witnessed a growing middle class
(Ghani, 2014; Hamid, 2010) which is partly linked to remittances sent over the past
few decades by family members abroad. Pakistan has consistently been in one of
the top few migrant origin countries (Pew Center, 2017), and in 2016 it received $20
billion in remittances. There is evidence that the growth of the Pakistani middle class
is partly by these remittances that allowed families to increase their consumption of
goods and services (Malik et al., 1993).
Labor Market and Marriage Market Returns for Women Medical Gradu-
ates Medical school is considered a leading option for families seeking labor, mar-
riage and status returns for their daughters, as medical graduates traditionally have
favorable marriage and labor market outcomes. There is a large demand for doctors,
as the ratio of physicians to population at 7.8:10,000 is low relative to the recom-
mended ratio of 23:10,000 (World Health Organization, 2015). High demand and
limited supply are reflected in relative wages. The average real wages of women
medical graduates are almost twice those of other college graduates. Even at higher
percentiles of the cumulative wage distribution, medical graduates earn more than
other college graduates (figure 1·2). From the perspective of the classic Roy (1951)
framework of self-selection, the high returns to skill in medicine imply that the high-
est ability women select into medicine, which is consistent with the high test scores
required to be admitted. Furthermore, despite only 25% of college educated women
working overall, medical graduates are also more than twice as likely to work as a
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woman with another college degree (Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2012)3.
The marriage market, characterised largely by arranged marriages, is also tradi-
tionally favorable for women medical graduates4. Arranged marriages decided by the
family instead of individuals differentiate this marriage setting from those in Western
countries5. For older Pakistani cohorts, an arranged marriage is as extreme as meet-
ing one’s spouse after being married. Although, the proportion of arranged marriages
has decreased over time, as elsewhere in the world (Rubio, 2014), in recent years
as many as 80% of marriages are arranged by the family6, and an additional few
mixed arranged/non-arranged (where individuals find each other first, and families
finalize the match). In this context, the family holds decision making power, and it is
widely documented that female medical graduates are the daughter-in-law of choice
by mothers searching for a spouse for their son. In an article from 2013, lawyer and
columnist Rafia Zakaria writes that being married to a medical graduate is similar to
having a trophy wife "It used to be that she only needed to be fair, from a good family,
charming, and pliable. Now it seems the perfect bride [...] – must also be a doctor.
Today, the doctor bride signifies status [...]. In this misogynistic equation, a man
who bosses around a woman is manly, but who bosses around a doctor is manliest."
[- Rafia Zakaria, Opinions, Dawn Newspaper, July 26, 2013]. Another newspaper
article quotes an official match maker as saying: "My best clients are mothers seeking
doctor wives for their sons. In social gatherings, it’s very prestigious to introduce
your daughter-in-law or wife as a doctor."[- Kamran Ahmed, Aisha Marriage Bu-
3. Although this is a low level of labor force participation, it is not different from that of women
in other parts of South Asia(Pande, 2015; Klaasen, 2015; World Bank, 2018).
4. I define the marriage market as the set of people available to marry one another in urban
Pakistan.
5. The marriage market is also different in that the average age at first marriage for women is
low, at 21 years (Demographic and Health Surveys 2017, Pakistan), the marriage rate is high at
67%, and the divorce rate a negligible 3%. In contrast, in the US mean age at first marriage is 27
years for women (US Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2017).
6. WGBH Public Radio, Interview with economist Tahir Andrabi, 2006.
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reau, BBC News, August 28, 2015]. These anecdotes also suggest that it is not just
going to medical school and meeting high achieving men that drives better matches
for medical graduates (Goldin, 1992) , but that the education itself is valued in the
marriage market (Nunn et al., 2018; Rosenzweig et al., 2002).
Explanations for this cultural aspect of the marriage market have recently re-
ceived academic attention. An anthropological study (Masood, 2019) interviewed fo-
cus groups of parents and directely asked parents why medical graduates are desirable
to them. The responses can be attritubed to three categories. First, medical gradu-
ate women are viewed as decent, hard working and respectable. One respondent says
"Doctors are wiser, you know. Other girls create problems with the mother-in-law, use
bad language. A doctor is sober, she will never do such things". And since medicine
is a socially respectable field families are proud to introduce a daughter-in-law who
is a doctor. Second medical graduates are perceived as intelligent women who will
educate their children and take care of the family. Some respondents commented that
they would not incur expenses such as private after school tuitions or doctor visits
for basic health problems if they had a doctor in the family (Persson, 2019). Finally,
should the family need it, a medical graduate could also find a job and contribute to
family earnings. In summary, the appeal of medical graduates stems from a signal of
marriageable qualities they are perceived to posses and their ability to contribute to
public goods within the household. Finally, from an economics standpoint, medical
graduates’ value can also be rationalized by the fact that they are more likely to work
and are well-paid, giving them better outside options to marriage. Therefore, medical
graduates may receive a greater number and quality of marriage offers, and be more
selective in who they choose.
Medical School The process of applying to medical school itself is simple but
rigorous. Prior to applying, students select the appropriate pre-college subjects and
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take high school board examinations. They apply to medical school or another college
at the end of high school. Addtionally, an entrance test is required for admission.
According to the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC)7 website, the single
most important determinant of admission is the entrance exam score which accounts
for 50% of the overall candidate score, followed by high school grades (40%) and
middle school grades (10%). Some schools may conduct interviews in the final rounds
of the admissions process, but the PMDC website does not indicate these as very
important or uniformly practiced. After the typical five years of medical school,
medical graduates can register to practice with their basic M.B.B.S degree, or pursue
a residency and fellowship.
Most colleges, medical or otherwise, are owned either publically or privately. Pub-
lic medical school can be highly subsidized, especially for high scoring students who
are eligible for scholarships. The typical cost of a private school is 2-3 times that of
a public school8. There is more parity in the time to complete school: public and
private medical schools typically take 5 years to complete, and other degree colleges
4 years to complete. In 1992, at the time of the policy change, there were 2 pri-
vate medical colleges and 17 public medical colleges. Since the mid-2000s Pakistan
has witnessed a large growth in the number of medical schools, especially in private
schools. Because this growth can interact with the effects of the 1992 policy change,
I do not include any birth cohorts that would be exposed to the rapid expansion of
medical schools in the mid-2000s.
The Policy Change Due to the shortage of women doctors in particular after
Pakistan’s independence in 1947, a women’s medical college with an initial class size
of 36 was established in 1948 (Fatima Jinnah Medical College). As the shortage of
7. The administrative body that regulates medical schools.
8. Sources: Prospectus’ of Aga Khan Medical College, Karachi Medical and Dental College, La-
hore University of Management Sciences, Karachi University.
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women doctors continued, 20% of seats in all other public and private medical colleges
were reserved for female students, and the remaining 80% reserved for male students.
As the demand for female medical education increased, however, the number of female
applicants outgrew the number of reserved seats (Masood, 2019). Further, in the early
1980s, medical education quality concerns led to a reduction in the total number of
medical seats. This reduction differentially affected women, and the score threshold
for women’s admission was made 7% higher than for men9 (Andrabi and Singh, 2015).
The turning point for women’s presence in medical school arrived in 1989 when
a group of women led by Shrin Munir filed a case against the old admissions policy,
alleging that they were denied admission despite scoring higher than several men.
A court ruling decreed that the admissions policy was unconstitutional, stating that
"the selection procedures violated [sections of] the Pakistani Constitution prohibiting
discrimination [...] on the basis of sex" (Shrin Munir and others v. Government of
Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another (PLD 1990 SC 295)10. Subse-
quently, the admissions policy was changed in 1991 to being based purely on merit.
For cohorts admitted in 1992 and thereafter, women and men had an equal opportu-
nity of being admitted.
After the change in admissions policy, the proportion of women in medical school
rapidly increased. I plot the female fraction of medical graduates using administrative
data in figure 2·1 and labor force survey data in figure A.1 in the Appendix. The dots
represent the proportion of female doctors (left hand scale) for a given birth cohort,
the lines are local polynomial fits. Women born in or after 1976 were young enough
at the time of policy removal to be affected by the equal opportunity it provided. At
that age they would still have the time to select pre-medical subjects, study and take
the entrance exam. Women born before 1976 are more likely to have completed their
9. The corresponding score numbers are 820 and 731 points respectively.
10. Available through: https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/pld-1990-sc-295/
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educational decisions when the policy was changed, and are less likely to be affected.
Notably, the proportion of women in medical school pre-policy change exceeds 20%
in the administrative data, which may be because of the presence of a women’s only
school, or possibly due to imperfect compliance, or men being more likely to drop
out of medical school. Unfortunately, without further data it is difficult to ascertain
which of those is the main explanation. Even though the constraint was not strict pre-
policy change, there is a noticeable increase in female proportion of medical graduates
for birth cohorts starting in 1976. In the administrative data the increase is of 10
percentage points, after which the proportion rises steadily. Pre-policy, on average
28% of medical graduates are women, and after the policy-change the proportion rises
to 55%. A third of the increase occured in the single year of the policy change. This
suggests that the old admissions policy substantially distorted medical admissions,
and meaningfully restricted women’s access to medical school.
Figure 2·2 plots the female share of medical graduates by birth cohort for other
fields reported in the labor force surveys for comparison. These fields are: general
Bachelors’ degrees, engineering degrees and post graduate (for example, Masters)
degrees. Although there was an increasing trend in female education across fields,
there is no clear jump around the 1976 birth cohort observed in fields that did not
experience a sudden reduction in barriers to entry.
Over time, medical schools have reported that growth in the number of female
medical students has been exponential and that male medical graduates are being
crowded out. For example, in 2014 one of the largest medical schools in Karachi
reported that 70% of its students were women 11. Table A.1 in the Appendix looks
at the crowd out of males in medical schools after the change in admissions. The
data are from the Labor Force Surverys (1990-2012), described below, collapsed to
the educational x birth cohort x city level. I regress the number of male medical
11. Dawn News, 2014.
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graduates on the number of female graduates interacted with being from a post-policy
birth cohort, the number of female medical graduates, and birth cohort and city fixed
effects. The main coefficient of interest is on the interaction term which indicates
that increasing the number of female medical students by two after the policy change
leads to about one less male medical student. This is a substantial change in the
composition of medical graduates, and in figure 2·5 in the Results section I show that
it translated to a compositional shift in registering doctors as well.
Variation by Distance to Medical School Medical schools are more likely to be
located in cities, and that is where the effects of the policy were strongest. Women
who live far from a medical school are less likely to attend, as evident in figure A.2
which shows that three quarters of all women medical graduates live in a city that
contains a medical school12 Women in cities with a medical school therefore plausibly
experienced a greater increase in the opportunity of attending after 1992. To formalize
this intuition I regress the probability of attending medical school on an interaction
between being born in or after 1976, and the distance to the nearest medical school
in 1992 when the policy change occurred.
Pr(Deg.Med.)icjt = β0 + β1(Treatedc ∗Distancej)
+αt + αj + αc + uicjt
(1.1)
Pr(Deg.Med.) equals 1 if female i in city j has a degree in medicine in survey
year t. Distance is measured in 1000 km13, αt is a year fixed effect, αj is a district
FE and αc is a cohort fixed effect. Table A.2 in the Appendix confirms that the
12. 0.2 percent of women who provide a reason for moving in the Labor Force Surveys report
moving for education.
13. Distance is the straight line distance between the centroid of the district with the closest medical
school and the centroid of the district where a woman resides
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policy change effects were stronger in cities that had a medical school. The distance
measure in column 1 of table A.2 is continuous, and in column 2 an indicator for
having a medical school in a woman’s residential city. Both coeffiients are similar,
and negative, implying in column 1 that every additional 1000 km of distance reduced
the probability of attending medical school by 9.8 percentage points. These results
also highlight that it is rare for women to travel for education in this context, even
to districts close by.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the main data sources and identification strategy.
1.3.1 Data
Labor Force Data The data for marriage, labor force outcomes, and educational
attainment are from the Labor Force Surveys of Pakistan. I create a data set of
repeated cross sections from 13 survey rounds between the years 1990 and 2012.
Although the survey collects data on individuals from urban, semi-urban and rural
populations from every province, I restrict my sample to cities because this is where
the population most affected by the policy change resides, as the previous section
on distance variation demonstrates. For similar reasons, I restrict my sample to
individuals with greater than a high school education, and born after 1965 (Pakistan
became an independent country in 1947, and data on earlier birth cohorts is noisy).
Finally I exclude individuals younger than 20 because they are likely to not have
reached the highest level of educational attainment they will attain in their life.
Table 3.1 provides sample summary statistics for women. Even in this urban sam-
ple, only 4% have a medical degree, which speaks to the elite status of medical school.
Most college going women obtain a non-medical and non-engineering degree. This
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includes every other kind of bachelor’s degree, from biology and history to business
administration14. Moving to non-educational characteristics, about two thirds of the
women are married when observed, and at 0.3% divorce is an extremely rare event. I
define the probability of working as indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual
reported working at least 1 hour in the past week for a pay or salary, for any profit
or family gain, or if they have a job or own enterprise that they will return to within
a month. It does not include working otherwise in a family farm or family business
(not for a monetary gain)15. 23% of college educated women report working using
this definition, which is low by developed country standards but not relative to other
developing countries (Pande, 2015). Monthly wage earnings are deflated to 2010 USD
using the CPI deflator provided by Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 16, and
the average wage of 210 USD monthly corresponds roughly to the wage of a middle
class individual.
Table 1.2 reports the average differences between female medical graduates and
other college graduates, for cohorts of women exposed to the reform ("treated"),
and previous cohorts ("non-treated"). Women in the two groups are similar in the
probability of being married and divorced and in their average age in the sample.
Medical women are more likely to work, earn more, and are more likely to marry
science professionals such as engineers and doctors. Their spouses are also on average
richer. In summary, medical women ex-ante did better on the labor and marriage
market than women with any other college degree. Post policy change, the differences
seem exacerbated, and my empiricaly strategy will formally identify these effects.
Additional Medical Doctors’ Data To complement labor force survey data I
use an additiona source of information on medical graduates’ employment. This is
the database of doctor registrations from the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council
14. 86% of women have less than a college degree.
15. The results are unchanged if I include this category in the definition of working.
16. FRED deflation data available here: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOE01PKA086NWDB
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(PMDC) website. A medical doctor is required to register with the PMDC if they
intend to practice in any capacity in the country. The data therefore provide a census
of 246, 000 registering doctors over the years 1952-2018. Other information includes
the city and school the degree was obtained from, and specialization. The advantage
of these data are the large number of observations, the lack of sampling variation
because they cover all registrations, and the details of registration patterns over a
long period of time and space.
1.3.2 Identification Strategy
The policy change in 1992 substantially decreased barriers to entry for women ap-
plying to medical school, and it’s benefit for an individual varied exogenously based
on her birth cohort. If she was young enough at the time of the policy change to
complete pre-medical courses in high school, study for an entrance test and take it,
she would be affected by the ease of access to medical school. I use year of birth as
the variable that defines if she is affected: if a woman is aged 16 or less at the time
of the policy in 1992 (born in or after 1976), she has a much greater opportunity to
go to medical school than did cohorts before her.
The single difference between outcomes of medical graduates exposed to the policy
change and those not would be confounded by marriage and labor force trends between
cohorts of educated women. To control for these, I estimate changes in outcomes
relative to the outcomes of other college educated women, a group of women that
closely resembles medical graduates. In a standard differences in differences strategy
that exploits variation across birth cohorts and between two or more groups (Duflo
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2001; Lucas, 2010; Bleakley, 2010), I estimate
Yicjt = β0 + β1(Treatedc ∗Deg.Medicjt) + β2Deg.Medicjt
+γXicjt + αt + αj + αc + uicjt
(1.2)
Yicjt is an outcome for a woman i, born in birth cohort c, observed in city j in
survey year t. Treated is an indicator for being in a treated birth cohort (born in or
after 1976), Deg.Med is an indicator for having a medical degree, and uicjt is a dis-
turbance term that captures unobserved variable that affect the outcome. αj are city
fixed effects that control for differences between cities, including differences in labor
and marriage markets, αc indicate an individual’s birth cohort, and αt describe the
survey year in which an individual is observed and control for year to year surveying
differences. Xicjt controls for age and age-squared.
β1 captures the policy induced change in average medical graduate outcomes rel-
ative to changes in other college women outcomes:
β1 = (ȲM,1 − ȲM,0)− (ȲC,1 − ȲC,0) (1.3)
where M and C depict medical and other college graduate, and 1 and 0 reflect
belonging to a treated cohort or not respectively.
My identification strategy would be invalid if medical graduates and other college
graduates would have different trends in outcomes even in the absence of the policy
change. Outcomes in the counterfactual of no policy change are unobservable, but the
presence of common trends between the two groups prior to the policy change would
provide suggestive evidence that the parallel trends assumption holds. To formally
test for this condition, I estimate an event study by grouping women into five year
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birth cohort intervals





icjt ∗Deg.Med.icjt + β3Deg.Med.icjt
+γXicjt + αt + αj + αc + uicjt
(1.4)
The main difference between (2) and (4) is that I replace the indicator for belong-
ing to a treated cohort with indicators for each 5 year birth cohort interval, Dkicjt.
This allows for the mapping of relative changes in medical graduate outcomes to 5
year birth cohort intervals instead of a larger treated group. Event study results are
presented in the next section.
A central concern for my identification strategy is that other college women could
indirectly be affected by the policy change. Ideally, this group would be unresponsive
to the policy change, and β1 capture only increases or decreases in outcomes for
medical graduates. However, women who pursue medicine post policy may plausibly
have pursued another college degree in the admissions process had not changed. If the
addition of these women in medicine changes a group characteristic of medical women,
the removal of these women from other college could also affect a group characteristic
of other college women, and β1 would be an over-estimate, adding any increases in
the first term of equation (3) to decreases in the second term, for example. I argue
that this concern is mitigated by the fact that medical graduates are a very small
fraction of college going women17, and the movement of women into medicine would
substantially change the medical graduate average, but not change the other college
average by much. In fact, if every woman who attended medical school post policy
was sourced from an other college program, the total would comprise 2.6% of post
policy cohorts of other college women. This is an upper bound. If 50% of women were
17. The total number of medical graduates is 611, compared to 17, 398 other college women.
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marginal and 50% would have attended medical school either way, the proportion of
switching women would be about 1% of other college women, but 50% of medical
women.
A second concern is that the data provide information on completed education,
and not on enrollment. If dropout rates are significantly around the policy change, my
results would be biased, and the direction of the bias depend on what type of individ-
uals drop out. Qualitative evidence suggests that completing a degree is considered
important for both marriage market and labor market gains for women, providing
an incentive to graduate. Additionally, the college dropout rate is low for Pakistan
relative to other developing countries, and especially so for women (Barro and Lee,
2013).
Other policy or environmental changes around 1992 could bias my results as well.
There are two categories of such policies that I consider: those that affect medical
school and those that affect women. In the 2000s there was a growth spurt in private
schools to help meet the demands of medical education. This is likely to have its own
effect on medical graduates, since different types of individuals go to private versus
public schools. To isolate the effect of the policy from the effect of any growth spurt, I
exclude birth cohorts that would be exposed to the growth in private medical schools.
A second concern is that other college women were also experiencing changes over
this time: college education for women was increasingly acceptable, and a change
over the cohorts born between 1965 and 1986 could bias the estimate of the policy
effect. To ameliorate this concern, I repeat my analysis using only women born
between 1970-1986, effectively comparing women born closer to each other around
the policy change. This is similar in spirit to a regression discontinuity, where I
compare individuals on two sides of a cutoff. The trade off in doing so is between
greater power, and comparing more similar cohorts. My results remain qualitatively
22
the same in either case.
Third, delayed decision making in medical school application, or grade repetition,
would imply that some individuals currently in pre-policy change cohorts could be ex-
posed to the policy in some ways. This is a common problem for analyses that rely on
the timing of decison making, and typically lead to a downwards bias in the estimate
because some individuals in the control group also experience treatment. This makes
the difference in outcomes between the post and pre-reform women smaller than it
truly is. Typically individuals finish high school by age 18 or 19, and then attend
the college they have chosen. According to UNESCO Institute Statistics (2010), the
percentage of repeaters for secondary school was 2.1% in 2008, which implies that not
a great number of women born before 1976 were exposed to the reform. Nevertheless,
in a second robustness excercise I do my analysis using only fully affected and fully
non-affected individuals. Again, the results hold in this case as well.
Finally, the policy was seemingly unanticipated by the general public, and does
not appear to have received wide coverage in newspapers at the time. If the policy
change was completely unanticipated by women, they would not prepare or invest any
differently than before, and more women would be admitted conditional on the same
level of investment as earlier. If awareness of the policy change increased over the
years, more recent cohorts of women may react to it by investing differently, implying
there may be heterogeneity in the effect of the policy change by birth cohort.
1.4 Results
This section presents how outcomes changed for medical graduates in the marriage
and labor markets post reform. The marriage outcomes I examine are the marriage
probability, spousal income, spousal educational attainment, spousal age gap, and,




I first look at the effect of cap removal on the marriage probability of female medical
graduates. Figure A.3 in the Appendix presents two plots that provide suggestive ev-
idence of the effect. I pool all post-1976 birth cohorts into one "synthetic" cohort, and
all previous cohorts into another pooled cohort. I then plot the marriage probability
of each when observed at the same age in the data, with panel A.3a for medical grad-
uates and panel A.3b for other college graduates. A 22-year old woman has a much
lower probability of being married than a 30 year old woman does. Since post-1976
cohorts are by design younger than pre-1976 cohorts in my study, it is important to
observe each at the same age to make statements about marriage probability. The
oldest medical graduates exposed to the policy change in the survey data are 36 years
of age. The lines are constructed using the average probability of being married at
every age, and for visualization purposes they are moving averages. As an example,
at age 20 the marriage probability of both affected and un-affected medical graduates
is less than 20% in panel A.3a.
The figure conveys two main points. First, medical graduates are less likely to be
married than previous cohorts of medical graduates at almost all ages past around
23 (the usual age of graduation from medical school). Even at the age of 30, the
difference is almost 2 percentage points. And second, there is no such noticeable
difference for other college women. This suggests that women who entered medical
school after cap removal had a decreased probability of being married. The graph
does not provide conclusive evidence, however, on whether the effect is due to affected
medical graduates delaying marriage or never getting married, and I use regression
analysis by sub-group to understand this further.
Table 1.4 presents estimates of equation (1) for the effect of policy change on
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marriage probability. The regression in the first column uses the full sample of urban
women with at least a college education aged 20-47. The coefficient is negative and
significant. Women who attended medical school after the policy change are about
14 percentage points less likely to be married when they are observed in the data
relative to older cohorts of medical women, even after differencing out effects due to
their being in a younger cohort of educated women. The coefficient is large, about
a fifth of the average probability of being married (0.63) in the sample. This could
be because the average is over a large age group of women, and on closer inspection
might actually comprise a delay effect.
To see if women are simply delaying marriage, in column 2 I estimate a version
of equation (1) where I interact indicators for medical graduate and treated birth
cohorts with age group indicators. If the coefficient remains significantly negative
for women in their 30s, medical women could be opting to never marry. However if
they are delaying marriage the average treatment effect for women in their 30s should
be smaller than that for women in their 20s. Rows 3-5 have interaction coefficients
for women in age groups 20-25, 26-30 and 31-36 respectively. The coefficient on the
interaction term for the youngest age group remains negative and significant, larger
than the average treatment effect. The coefficient for women in their late 20s is
smaller and that for women in their 30s is smallest and statistically insignificant.
The coefficient for the youngest and oldest group of women are statistically different
from one another (the p-value for the null that they are the same is 0.0097), as are
the coefficients for the middle and oldest age group (p-value= 0.0285). Moreover,
88% of women in their 30s are married, more than twice the percentage of women in
their 20s. This suggests that the large coefficient in column 1 is mainly a delay effect.
The policy change caused observed differences between cohorts of medical women
if the parallel trends assumption holds. Although I cannot observe the counterfactual
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of no policy change, a lack of pre-trends, checked in an event study analysis, would
suggest that medical and other college graduates would have similar trends in the
absence of the reform.
Results are shown in figure 1·5. The points represent coefficients of the interac-
tion between being a medical graduate and cohort of birth (measured in intervals of
5 years). Two important features of the graph stand out. First, younger cohorts of
medical graduates have a much lower marriage probability than older medical grad-
uates, which supports the findings in Table 1 above. Second, medical graduates and
other college women have similar trends prior to the policy change, which is suggestive
evidence that the parallel trends assumption for differences-in-differences is justified.
It is surprising that despite being coveted traditionally in the marriage market, the
group of women in medical school post-policy change actually delayed marriage. Two
potential mechanisms could explain this finding. First, the option value of marriage
could be lower post policy change than for previous cohorts. In that case the value
of staying single longer would be relatively higher because women are earning their
own income, or because they are from wealthier backgrounds. Second, it could be
because their own value decreased in the marriage market and they were not recieving
as many offers as before. To disentangle these stories, in the next sections I examine
the probability of working, spousal income conditional on marrying, and parental
characteristics of medical graduates.
1.4.2 Labor Force Participation
In table 1.5 I present results for the effect of the policy change on the probability
of working. Column (1) reports results for the main specification, and column (2)
separates women by age group. If ability is the main driver of labor force participation,
I expect post-policy cohorts of women to be less likely to work. I find the opposite
result: women overall increase their likelihood of working by 8 percentage points.
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The increase is economically meaningful, given that only 23% of college educated
women work. It is just under being statistically significant at the 10% level. When
individuals are separated by age groups I find that medical women in their late 20s
and 30s are significantly more likely to work than medical women in those age groups
before. Women in their late 20s are 16 pp more likely to work, and in their 30s are 18
pp more likely to work, both of which are substantial effects. This result complements
the marriage results that showed women in their 20s were delaying marriage to their
30s, and suggests an answer to the question: what are women doing now that they
postpone marriage? They are participating in labor market work. Together my results
highlight the fact that after the policy change women were more likely to work and
delay marriage.
Figure 1·9 follows medical graduates relative to other college women for every
five year birth cohort interval between 1961-1985. Each coefficient plotted can be
interpreted as the average effect of the policy change on medical women born in that
cohort relative to other college women. Although the coefficients are noisier than
for the marriage results, prior to the policy change they hover around 0 and are not
consistent with strong trend differences. In contrast, there is a sharp increase in the
probability of working for the cohorts immediately after the reform.
The decision to marry and to work can be interrelated, and married and single
women have varied work patterns, and table A.3 of the Appendix explores the results
of the policy effect on the joint probability of decreasing marriage and working in a
bivariate probit model, under the assumption that the errors determining marriage
and working rates are jointly normally distributed. The signs on each coefficient is
consistent with women delaying marriage and working, and the two outcomes are
strongly negatively correlated, suggesting that married women are much less likely to
work than single women in this context. This is similar to the relationship between
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work and marriage documented historically among women in the US before the 1970s
(Blau and Kahn, 2007).
Medical graduates post-reform could increase the intensive margin of their labor
force participation, but I do not find evidence that they worked more hours condi-
tional on working than previous cohorts (table A.7). Hours worked are defined as the
total number of hours worked last week, and a Heckman selection correction proce-
dure accounts for selection into working (see section 4.5 on wages for details of the
procedure). One reason that they did not significantly work more hours could be
that on average employed women in the sample work 40 hours a week, which is the
equivalent of a full-time job and does not leave much room for additional hours.
I complement analysis on working using additional data from the Pakistan Medical
and Dental Council (PMDC), which contains information on every medical graduate
that registers with the intention to practice. Figure 2·4 plots the number of women
that register to pratice with a basic degree panel A and with a specialized degree panel
B. Each point represents the number of women medical graduates born in a given year
and registering to practice. The number of women registering with a basic medical
degree jumped from about 1000 to 1500 for treated cohorts, and increased steadily
thereafter. The same is true for women registering to practice after specializing, but
here the numbers are smaller and indicate that many more women practice with their
basic degree. At least in absolute terms, a greater number of female medical students
translated into a greater number of female medical doctors.
How much did the increase in the number of female doctors contribute to the
population of working doctors? Figure 2·5 plots the female proportion of working
medical graduates (NumberFemaleRegistering
TotalNumberRegistering
) in panels C and D. Panel C, constructed
using LFS data, and panel D, using PMDC data, both show evidence that the the
medical profession became increasingly feminized as the proportion of working doctors
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that are women increased. This could imply interesting changes in the characteristics
of the medical labor force, and is the subject of ongoing research.
In summary, after the policy medical graduates were more likely to work, but did
not increase the hours worked. The absolute number of female doctors increased and
the medicine became increasingly feminized, a fact which could have implications for
the future of medicince in Pakistan.
1.4.3 Spousal Income
Now that I have established that treated medical graduates were delaying marriage,
what type of men were they marrying? I start by estimating equation (1) on the
subset of my sample that is currently married. The first coefficient in column (1) of
Table 1.6 is the interaction effect of being a medical graduate and attending school
after policy change. The coefficient below it is just the effect of being a medical
graduate relative to another college degree graduate. Both coefficients are positive
and significant. Medical graduate women tend to marry richer spouses than other
college women in general, and treated medical graduates married even richer spouses
than the medical graduates before them. Treated medical graduates have spouses
with about 33 percent higher log incomes than non-treated medical graduates, about
twice the difference between medical graduates and other college graduates overall.
Controlling of the age of the spouse does not change the results, suggesting that the
higher spousal income was not simply due to women marrying when they are older
and marrying older men.
Another way to assess spousal wealth is by looking at the percentile of spouse’s
income in the income distribution (column (2)). This gives a measure of spousal in-
come relative to the distribution of spousal incomes in the sample. It also addresses
the concern that we could observe an increase in spousal income simply due to rising
inequality. For example, it could be that women marry men in the same income
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percentile as before, but the money amount earned by men in that percentile has in-
creased. As shown in column (2), this might be true to some extent, but doesn’t seem
to be the entire story. There is evidence that treated cohorts of medical graduates
married men in higher income percentiles than before, and were higher in the income
distribution by about 7-8 percentile points.
1.4.4 Other Marriage Results: Spousal Attainment, Divorce Rate and
Spousal Age Gap
Spousal income for treated medical graduates could increase because they are marry-
ing more qualified men than before. The differences in means in table 1.2 reveals that
medical graduates are most likely to marry male medical graduates and engineers,
and less likely to marry other college graduates. Table A.5 in the Appendix presents
estimates of the average treatment effect for the following outcomes for women: the
probability of marrying a medical graduate in column (1), of marrying an engineering
graduate in column (2), of marrying an other college graduate (column 3) and of
marrying a post graduate male (column 4). The table omits regressions for males
with a high school degree or less and males with an agricultural degree because they
are not interesting cases, but those males are included in the regression sample.
Looking first at the mean of the dependent variables, only 13% of the women in
the sample are married to a medical graduate or engineer, while 39 % of them are
married to an other college graduate, and 27% to a post graduate). This corresponds
with the idea that medical and engineering male graduates are more rare and coveted,
and the fact that other college is a much broader category and includes several degree
types and subjects. Turning to the coefficients in the three columns for medical
graduates substantiates the prior that female medical graduates are more likely to
marry male medical and engineering men, and less likely to marry other college and
post graduate men. This could partly be because female medical graduates meet male
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medical graduates in school, and partly because of homogamy in arranged marriages
between individuals in hard science professional careers. The interaction coefficient
in columns (1) and (4) is suggestive evidence of this trend being undone because
medical women were less likely to marry medical men and more likely to marry post
graduates. This is interesting because if male medical graduates are also coveted in
the marriage market, treated female medical graduates are marrying fewer of them.
This could purely be a mechanical effect, since women crowded out men in medical
school. By 2014, some medical schools reported that as much as 70 % of the student
body was female 18. As a result, marriages for medical women are likely to become
less homogamous over time.
I look at two additional characteristics of marriages: the probability of divorce
and the spousal age gap. The probability of divorce is an indicator of match sta-
bility in the literature (Autor et. al. (2018)), and spousal age gap an indicator of
the bargaining power and autonomy experiences by women in marriage (Jensen and
Thornton (2003)).
In column 1 of table A.6 the average probability of divorce is very low for the
sample, only about 2%. Medical graduates are less likely to get divorced than other
college graduates. However, the coefficient on the interaction term is close to 0 and
the standard error is small, indicating no differential effect for treated cohorts of
medical graduates.
Column 2 shows that the average age gap between spouses is 6 years, and that
medical graduates have on average a 0.8 year smaller age gap than other college
women do. However, again, there is no effect of the policy on the age gap between
younger female medical graduates and their spouses. In places where women tend to
marry younger than men, and there is population growth, an excess supply of women
over men emerges in the marriage market (Sautmann (2014)). One way to resolve
18. Dawn News, 2014.
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the surplus is for the equilibrium spousal age gap to decrease, as women start to
marry later and marry men not much older than themselves. Even though there is
an excess of medical graduate women over men after policy change in this case, there
is no decrease in the spousal age gap. Instead, the resolution of the surplus female
medical graduates might be through their marrying other college male graduates and
not older male medical graduates.
1.4.5 Wages
I observe wages for the truncated distribution of individuals who choose to work,
and not the full distribution of wages. To correct for selection into working, I use
a two stage Heckman selection correction procedure. In the first stage I predict the
probability of working with the specification
Pr(Work)icjt = α0 + α1Wicjt + uicjt (1.5)
The controls W include family income, the number of children, age, and indicators
for being married, educational degree, birth cohort, cit and year. Family income
is measured using the neighborhood type of the respondent. This takes on three
values: high, middle and low, and is reported for everyone in the sample. I chose this
measure instead of household income because it is likely less elastic to one member
of the household working and earning, and therefore determined prior to the policy
change. This concen is addressed in greater detail in the mechanism section where I
use income neighborhood to determine the selection of medical graduates.
After using thse covariates to predict the probability of working, I calculate the Inverse
Mills Ratio (IMR) and include it as an additional covariate while estimating the effect
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of the policy change on wages with my main specification. This is the second stage.
Log(RealWage)icjt = β0 + β1(Treatedc ∗Deg.Medicjt) + β2Deg.Medicjt
+β3IMRicjt + γXicjt + αt + αj + αc + vicjt
(1.6)
The outcome, measured as the logarithm of the real monthly wage, changes by
a small positive and insignificant amount after the policy change ( table A.8 in the
Appendix). Medical women’s average ability decreased after the policy, the number of
women increased, but wages did not decrease in response to the increased competition,
or lower ability.
A potential explanation could be that male and female medical graduate wages are
determined jointly in a unified market, and indeed, men experienced no significant
wage changes around the policy as well. There is no evidence that the supply of
medical graduates increased overall, only of a change in their gender composition
around the policy, and potentially a slight increase in average ability as low ability
males are crowded out. To the best of my knowledge, wages for doctors in public
institutions are not set differently by gender. There is scope for different wages in
private practice however, which accounts for a substantial fraction of medical practice.
In 2016, the private sector comprised 35% of all physicians, and 75% of the urban
population consulted a private doctor at least once (World Health Organization,
2016).
Even if male and female wages are different, a second reason could be that the
policy change led to two counteracting forces for women: an increase in their number
lowered wages, but, positive externalities enhanced productivity and increased wagess.
If these forces are roughly equal in size, there would be no net change in wages.
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1.4.6 Advertisement demand for women medical graduates
One measure of value on the marriage market is the number and quality of marriage
offers a woman receives. In this section I descriptively explore marriage offers for
medical graduates and other types of graduates using matrimonial advertisements.
As mentioned earlier, these are advertisements that are usually placed by families
seeking spouses for their children. The ads I collected are from the leading English
language newspaper, Dawn News, and are likely placed by a select population of
parents from middle to upper class, English speaking families. Moreover, the ads
could be placed by families that did not want to, or were not able to, find a match
in only traditional ways.
Despite this, the advertisments provide rich data on the traits of those seeking
a match, and the characteristics of who they demand to marry, that are likely not
captured in survey data. Further, they are placed largely by a social class of families
that are similar to those affected by the policy change. I use the data to plot the
proportion of advertisements that asked for a woman medical graduate for their son,
along with for women of other degrees by birth cohort (figure 1·10). The proportion
of ads that request a medical graduate is higher than for other degree types, and
especially considering the actual proportions of degree types of women in the Labor
Force Surveys. The second feature of the graphs is that the demand for women
medical graduates is relatively stable, unlike the demand for male medical graduates.
The caveat in interpreting the data are, again, that it is of a select population that
may be changing over time. Further, there may be complex strategies determining
what type of individual families request. With these caveats in mind, the graphs
suggest that women medical graduates are demanded more often in marriage ads
than women with other types of education, and that this demand was relatively
consistent for birth cohorts over the policy change.
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1.4.7 Robustness
Comparing Similar Cohorts. The policy effects are found by comparing the av-
erage outcomes of the ten cohorts before the policy change, to the ten cohorts after
the policy change. But arguably, a window of ten cohorts may be too wide, and
women born in 1965 too different from the women born in 1985. They could also be
facing different environments, including social attitudes towards women’s education
that could bias results. To mitigate this concern, as a first robustness check I restrict
the pre-policy groups of women to be born within the past 5 birth cohorts of the
policy change (table A.9, column (1) in the Appendix), effectively comparing groups
of women born closer around the policy change cutoff. For all main outcomes, coeffi-
cients remain similar in magnitude, and despite the loss in power owing to a smaller
sample size, they remain largely statistically significant, suggesting that even among
women born in very close birth cohorts, there were observable differences in outcomes
after the policy change.
Removing Partially Treated Individuals. I have assigned women 16 or
younger at the time of the policy change in 1992 as being exposed to the policy
change. But there are reasons to believe that slightly older women may be affected
as well. For one, some 17-19 year olds, for exampl, could still be making or repeat-
ing educational decisions, and apply to medical school at an older than usual age.
Second, some medical schools were potentially anticipating the policy change, and
adjusting women’s seats in an ad-hoc manner prior to the policy change (Andrabi
and Singh, 2015). Therefore the opportunity of attending medical school may have
increased slightly for women who were slightly older than 16 in 1992. Assigning these
individuals as unexposed to the policy change could bias estimates downwards.
To account for these ages being partially treated, I exclude birth cohorts 1972-
1975, which correspond to individuals aged 16-19 at the time of the reform (table A.9,
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column (2)). Reassuringly, most of my key findings are qualititatively the same, and
the coefficients are larger and statistically significant for the probability of being
married and marrying richer spouses.
Placebo Policy. Changing trends over the birth cohorts 1965-1985 are a sig-
nificant concern, and it is possible that comparing cohorts around 1976 is capturing
largely trends such as declining marriage rates among college educated women. If
this is the case, I should observe similar coefficients when I place a placebo policy in
other birth years. I test this prediction using 3 different placebo birth years: 1960,
1965 and 1970 (table A.9, columns (3)-(5)). To use three different placebo years, I
expand the sample to birth cohorts ranging from 1955-1986. With each placebo year
the coefficients for probability of marriage are much smaller than with the actual
policy year, and none of them are statistically significant. Spousal income coefficients
are also statistically insignificant, and for the placebo year that corresponds fo the
cohort born in 1970, which is closest to the actual policy, the coefficient is almost
zero. Finally, the coefficients for the probability of working for placebo policies in
birth closest to 1976 are statsitically insignificant and small. All of these suggest
that the main policy results are not purely trend-driven, but capture the effect of the
policy change in 1976.
Policy Effects for Men. Finally, the findings for medical women could be driven
by trends in the overall medical field. For example, improved working conditions for
doctors due to better hospitals could incentivize men and women medical graduates
to work more. A second rationale for analyzing the policy effects for male medical
graduates is that the policy led to women crowding out some men, and those that
remained were of higher quality. Both are factors that could result in opposite and
symmetric changes for men than for women.
Despite evidence suggesting men were crowded out, I find no effect of the policy
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change on the probability of working, the probability of marriage, hours worked,
spousal income and wages for men (section 8.3 in the Appendix). The only notable
difference is that male medical graduates increased marrying medical graduate women
at the expense of marrying other college graduates. This result is symmetric to women
medical graduates being less likely to marry male medical graduates and diversifying
their marriages post-policy change, and could be due to medical graduates having a
preference for marrying each other, but fewer male graduates in the marriage market
overall. This is one way in which the policy affected matching in the marriage market.
The lack of other labor and marriage market changes, however, suggests the medical
field was not rapidly evolving around the time of the policy.
Surprisingly, I also find that male medical graduates were not selected differently
on observable family characteristics after the policy change. The policy change af-
fected mainly women, perhaps because the value of medical school is different for
women than for men, who traditionally have numerous career opportunities and em-
ployment options.
1.5 Mechanisms
My findings imply that medical graduates post-reform not only had a higher prefer-
ence for work over marriage, they were also highly rewarded on the marriage market.
They delayed marriage, and were more likely to work in their late 20s and 30s. More-
over, higher spousal incomes and unchanged wages suggest they experienced outcomes
at least as favorable as the cohorts before them in the labor and marriage markets.
It also motivates the idea that higher wages were not the main impetus for medical
graduates working more.
In this section I consider three channels for my results. First, I examine the
selection of medical graduates on ability and income group, second, selection on
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other family characteristics, and third, a treatment effect of going to school with
more women. Selection on ability and parental income does not fully explain the
results. In fact, selection post reform worsened and should induce medical graduates
to work less.
Next, I consider other family characteristics suggested by the literature to influence
women’s labor force participation, and labor force participation in general: gender
norms, occupational connections, and being from a migrant family. Although I find
no significant change in medical school entry along any of these dimensions, two
groups in particular increased their labor force participation post reform: middle class
medical graduates, and medical graduates from families that migrated from smaller
to larger cities ("movers"). Though distinct groups, both are part of the broad urban
middle class. It is possible that going to school with more women encouraged these
medical graduates to work (a positive treatment effect). Alternatively, compositional
changes within these two groups could have allowed harder working women entry to
medical school post-reform. While both channels are consistent with my results, I
show that it is unlikely the effects were completely driven by within group selection
on unobservables.
First, I motivate my anaysis of the three channels through a simple framework.
Selection on ability and parental income Consider a simple Roy (1951) based
framework with the following assumptions:
1. The benefit from working depends positively on exogenous ability.
2. Women can only work when single.
3. The distribution of marriage offers varies with ability, but is constant over time
conditional on ability.
4. There are no general equilibrium effects.
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In this framework it is higher ability medical graduates who benefit from delaying
marriage and working. Therefore, once the high entry threshold for women is removed
and the average ability of medical women lower, medical women should be less likely to
work and stay single than before. Note that allowing for general equilibrium effects
such that attending medical school with more women created greater competition
would not change this prediction. Increased competition could decrease the average
wage, disincentivizing work. Further, as long as the first assumption holds, it is the
highly able that are more likely to work. In fact, my findings suggest that they
were doing the opposite, which indicates that selection on ability may not sufficiently
explain the results, and I need to modify the framework.
My predictions are largely driven by assumptions (1)-(3). A positive correlation
between ability and the benefit from working, for example wages, is documented in the
literature (Cawley et al., 2001) and makes the first assumption a natural one. That
women only work when single is an important assumption because it justifies delaying
marriage: women who benefit from working will delay marriage in order to do so. This
assumption is a more extreme version of the empirical fact that married women are
much less likely to work than single women in this context, and have not seen the rise
in labor force participation that married women in the US have experienced (Blau
and Kahn, 2007). Finally, assumption 3 is crucial to the prediction because it implies
there is no net cost to delaying marriage: eventually a given woman will marry the
same type of individual she would have before. This assumption is not innocuous,
but greatly simplifies the model. It can be justified under certain conditions, such
as if women delay marriage only by a few years, and the distribution of offers does
not change in that time frame, or, a woman’s education primarily determines match
quality, and not her age.
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Selection on parental income I modify the framework first by allowing for se-
lection on parental income.
I first empirically test for changes in parental income after the reform. Table 1.7
directly explores the selection of medical graduates, using neighborhood type to proxy
for parental income, and shows that richer women selected into medical school post-
reform (column 1). In column 2 I look at the probability of being from a high income
neighborhood relative to a low income one, and in column 3 the probability of being
from a middle income neighborhood relative to a low income one. The three columns
together imply that medical graduates were more likely to be high and middle income
women after the admission threshold was lowered, and middle class women comprise
the larger proportion of these.
Two data caveats are important to note here. First, I observe family information
for women in their current household in the Labor Force Surveys. Since almost
all married women live with their spouses and single women with their parents, I
observe parental household information for single women. To test hypotheses about
the selection of medical graduates overall and mitigate the concern that single medical
graduates are different from all medical graduates, I analyze single women who are
still young and will presumably go on to marry. At age 25 only 31% of female medical
graduates are married and this is the cutoff age I use (this increases to 55% by age
36). An alternative strategy of pooling married and single medical graduates, and
assuming assortative matching, leads to qualitatively similar results.
Second, it is important to ensure that family characteristics are determined prior
to the policy change, and not affected by it. I use the neighborhood type of a family
as a measure of parental income because it is less likely to respond to the reform than
household income is. A substantial change in individual income would be required
to shift the household by an entire neighborhood income class. However rare, this
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scenario is not impossible. But note that since salary typically grows with age, the
concern is smaller for younger medical graduates who are just starting their careers,
as will be the case for the single medical graduates aged 25 or younger I use to study
the selection of medical graduates overall.
One way to motivate selection on parental income in the framework is to allow
lower ability women with resources to score slightly better on tests and be admitted
post reform, for example because they can hire tutors to help raise their score slightly:
1. The benefit of working depends positively on ability and negatively on parental
income.
2. Parental income can help individuals improve test scores in a way that is increas-
ing in parental income and decreasing in innate ability. For example, suppose
intrinsic ability a is distributed on the interval [0, A], parents invest I and ad-
mission test scores are a function of both: s = a + k(A − a)α ∗ Iγ, where k is
small and α, γ ∈ [0, 1].
Then test scores are increasing in a, increasing n I, and ds/dI is decreasing
in a. Only individuals with ability close to the maximum A will have the
highest scores, irrespective of parental income, middle ability individuals and
low ability individuals with parental income will have medium test scores, and
the low ability individuals from poorer households have the lowest test scores.
3. The distribution of marriage offers is rising in ability and parental income, but
constant within ability and parental income.
In this framework, lowering the admission threshold results in higher parental
income women entering medical school because medium scoring women are those
from better backgrounds. However, allowing for selection on parental income also
doesn’t explain the findings, because note that these women are expected to be less
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likely to work than before. In addition to being low ability, they also experience a
negative household income effect. This prediction that richer women be less likely to
work can be tested empirically by examining the labor force participation for each
income class ex-ante and is confirmed in the data (table A.10 in the Appendix).
Therefore, the framework needs to allow for other types of selection.
Selection on other characteristics. I explore three dimensions of family charac-
teristics that potentially affect labor force participation decisions: gender norms and
women’s independence in the family, family connections in medicine, and being from
a migrant family.
Women whose mother or peers’ mothers worked are more likely to work themselves
(Fernandez, 2011; Olivetti et al., 2018). Therefore one proxy for family gender norms
is the likelihood that a woman’s mother works. Moreover, the absence of an extended
family is associated with women’s independence in the family (Debnath, 2015), and
the number of family members cohabiting is plausibly a second correlate of gender
norms.
Alternatively, perhaps lower ability is compensated by being from a well-connected
family post-reform. Individuals with occupational networks are also better able to
find jobs (Munshi, 2011; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006). I measure connectedness to
the medical field with the number of other medical graduates in the family.
Finally, migrant status is related to income background, social mobility, and labor
market behavior (Mobarak et al., 2014, 2017; Garlick et al., 2016). Families that
migrated from elsewhere could be different in the way they invest in their children,
and in their aspirations for rising in social class. Movers in medical school are generally
originally from smaller cities and settled in a large city several years ago (table A.13
in the Appendix). These families are a part of the larger urban middle class: they
have the means to move, but plausibly went to lower quality schools and had fewer
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resources than big city natives.
In tables A.11 and A.12 in the Appendix, I show that medical graduates post-
reform were not selected significantly differently on these parental characteristics.
This is inconsistent with a channel where a hard working group of women is more
likely to enroll in medical school post-reform. Instead, of the groups I analyze, two
groups substantially increased their labor force participation post-reform: women
from migrant families, and middle class women.
Movers and middle class women substantially increased their likelihood of
working post-reform. So far I have shown that richer women, in particular middle
class women were more likely to enter post policy, but these women are negatively
selected to work. Further, the selection of medical graduates didn’t change on other
key parental characteristics. In this section I further characterize the women around
the reform by showing that despite not being any more likely to work ex-ante, two
groups of women significantly increased their propensity to work: middle class women
and women from migrant families.
Table 1.8 separately shows the marriage rates, labor force participation rates, and
probability of working as a single woman for middle class women and all other women
(rich and low income women pooled). Both middle class and non-middle class medical
graduates have lower marriage rates post-reform. But marriage rates are much lower
for middle class medical graduates, who are also far more likely to work overall and
work as single women. In fact, the second row estimates policy effects for non-middle
class women and shows there was little or no net change in labor force participation
for all other medical graduates. The coefficients for these medical graduates are much
smaller, or negative, and statistically insignificant.
Table 1.9 repeats the exercise for migrant medical graduates as well as those selected
around other parental characteristics. Medical graduates from families that moved are
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substantially more likely to stay single and work when single post-reform, suggesting
an increased joint probability of staying single and working.
A change in selection, or a treatment effect of attending school with more women,
would both explain why these groups of medical graduates are more likely to work.
For example, families from smaller cities, or middle class families, may be particularly
sensitive to how many women work in a field before they allow their daughter to work.
Once the number of women in medical schools and hospitals increases, these families
may increasingly allow their daughters to work as well. Alternatively, movers post-
reform may be selected differently along other unobservable dimensions, and may be
more likely to work regardless of the reform.
While my results are consistent with both mechanisms, I use a measure developed
by Oster (Oster, 2017, Clemens et al., 2016, Garlick et al., 2016) to assess if the results
could purely be selection driven. Oster’s δ quantifies how large selection on unobserv-
ables relative to selection on observables would have to be for a zero treatment effect.
If observable controls based on economic models are carefully selected by researchers,
they plausibly have greater explanatory power than unobservables. As such, if Oster’s
δ is greater than 1 selection on unobservables relative to observables would have to
be unusually large to justify no treatment effect at all. I calculate Oster’s δ with and
without the full set of controls for marriage rates, labor force participation rates, and
the probability of working when single. For both middle class and migrant medical
graduates, the value of Oster’s δ generally exceeds 1, suggesting that the effects are
not purely selection driiven, and there likely is a treatment effect.
1.6 Conclusion
In this project I study the effects of an dmissions policy change that equalized ease of
access for men and women in medical schools in Pakistan. I document first that ex-
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ante the average medical woman is more likely to work, earn more, and have marriage
market gains in the form of greater spousal incomes, stable marriages, and smaller
spousal age gaps, over women with any other type of college degree.
Second, I show that when the policy changes the female proportion of medi-
cal graduates increases rapidly, indicating the previous policy meaningfully distorted
women’s enrollment. Third, I look at marriage and labor outcomes of medical gradu-
ates after the policy change. Medical graduates after the reform delay marriage, have
wealthier spouses, and are more likely to work in their late 20s and 30s than previ-
ous cohorts. They are also more likely to be selected positively on parental wealth.
Together, my results highlight that post-reform women were more motivated to work
and experienced better outside options to marriage.
My findings imply that lowering the ability threshold for admitting women into an
elite education such as this does not result in worse outcomes for medical graduates,
nor does it admit women who are less likely to work. I find evidence inconsistent
with selection on a host of parental characteristics for the results. Instead, I show
that middle class women and women from migrant families were significantly affected
and increased their labor force participation. Differential within-group selection, or
a treatment effect of attending school with more women, would both be possible
explanations for my finding. From a policy perspective, lowering the ability threshold
was not detrimental to medical graduates nor the labor supply of medical women.
The reform potentially allowed certain groups the opportunity to work and catch up
with urban higher classes in income and status.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Sample Summary Statistics: Labor Force Surveys
Mean Standard Deviation Obs. Min Max
Engineering degree 0.02 0.15 9, 544 0 1
Medical degree 0.04 0.18 9, 544 0 1
Other college degree 0.71 0.45 9, 544 0 1
Post graduate degree 0.22 0.42 9, 544 0 1
Age 29.33 6.31 9, 544 20 47
Married 0.63 0.48 9, 544 0 1
Divorced 0.00 0.06 9, 544 0 1
Work 0.22 0.42 9, 544 0 1
Wage in 2010 USD 210 159 2, 040 0.07 1, 290
Note: The table presents summary statistics of means, standard deviations, range and
the number of observations for dependent and independent variables used in the paper
and appendix. The sample is of women aged 20-47, residing in cities, and with at least
a college degree. Data are from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys of
Pakistan, 1990-2010. The definition of working includes working for a wage or family
gain for at least an hour last week, having a job even if the individual did not work
last week, and working for a family business or farm. The wage is the real monthly
wage expressed in 2010 USD.
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Table 1.2: Differences in Means between Medical Graduates and Other College Graduates
β SE Mean Mean Number Number
Med. Grad. Other Grad. Med. Grad. Other Grad.
Birth year≤1976
Pr(Married) 0.01 0.02 0.78 0.77 385 8984
Pr(Divorced) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 385 8984
Age 0.89 0.47 37.05 36.16 385 8984
Pr(Work) 0.34 0.02 0.63 0.29 385 8984
Log(wage) 0.60 0.06 10.11 9.51 144 1962
Pr(Marry Less than College) -0.11 0.03 0.11 0.23 270 6280
Pr(Marry Engg.) 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.07 270 6280
Pr(Marry Med. Grad) 0.38 0.01 0.43 0.05 270 6280
Pr(Marry Other College) -0.25 0.03 0.13 0.38 270 6280
Pr(Marry Post Grad) -0.09 0.03 0.19 0.27 270 6280
Log(Spousal Income) 0.19 0.06 10.21 10.03 139 2927
Spousal Age Gap -0.81 0.25 5.20 6.01 270 6280
Birth year≥1976
Pr(Married) -0.08 0.03 0.46 0.54 226 8414
Pr(Divorced) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 226 8414
Age 0.81 0.24 27.45 26.64 226 8414
Pr(Work) 0.38 0.03 0.66 0.28 226 8414
Log(wage) 0.92 0.08 10.05 9.13 113 1661
Pr(Marry Less than College) -0.15 0.05 0.18 0.33 87 3521
Pr(Marry Engg.) 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.04 87 3521
Pr(Marry Med. Grad) 0.27 0.02 0.29 0.02 87 3521
Pr(Marry Other College) -0.18 0.05 0.17 0.35 87 3521
Pr(Marry Post Grad) -0.00 0.05 0.24 0.25 87 3521
Log(Spousal Income) 0.55 0.10 10.36 9.81 54 1704
Spousal Age Gap -0.59 0.49 4.97 5.56 87 3521
Note: The table presents differences in means for female medical graduates and other college graduates. The sample
is of women aged 20-47, residing in cities, and with at least a college degree. Birth cohorts born before 1976 were
less likely to be affected by the policy change, while those born in or after 1976 are likely to be affected. Data are
from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010. The definition of working includes working for
a wage or family gain for at least an hour last week, having a job even if the individual did not work last week, and
working for a family business or farm. The wage is the real monthly wage expressed in 2010 USD.
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Treated x Med. Grads -0.1569∗∗∗
(0.0362)
[-4.3288]
Treated Age[20-25] x Med Grad -0.2128∗∗∗
(0.0374)
[-5.7338]
Treated Age[26-30] x Med Grad -0.1801∗∗∗
(0.0350)
[-5.1763]





District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.65 0.65
Note: The table reports the effects of the policy change
on the marriage rate of medical graduates. Standard er-
rors in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Wild cluster bootstrap
t statistics are reported in square brackets. "Treated"
women are those exposed to the policy change. Data are
from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys,
1990-2010. Column (1) presents estimates of equation 3.1
for the marriage probability of the full sample of women
in cities, aged 20-47 and with at least a college degree.
Column (2) interacts the interaction term with an indica-
tor for 3 for different age groups: 20-25, 26-30 and 31-36.
The regression estimated is: Yicjt = β0 + β1Treated[20 −
25] ∗Med.Gradicjt + β2Treated[26− 30] ∗Med.Gradicjt +
β3Treated[31 − 36] ∗ Med.Gradicjt + β4Med.Gradicjt +
β5Xicjt+β6Age∗Med.Gradicjt+β7Age2+αj+αc+αt+uicjt.
The coefficients on each of the own terms are included in
the regression but not reported here.
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Table 1.5: Probability of Working
Probability(Work)
(1) (2)
Treated x Med. Grads 0.0844
(0.0496)
[1.7004]
Treated Age[20-25] x Med Grad 0.0786
(0.0524)
[1.6304]
Treated Age[26-30] x Med Grad 0.1566∗∗∗
(0.0502)
[3.2716]





District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.23 0.23
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change
on the labor force participation of medical graduates.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth
cohort level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Wild cluster bootstrap t statistics are reported in square
brackets. "Treated" women are those exposed to the
policy change. Data are from repeated cross sections
of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010. Column (1)
presents estimates of equation 3.1 for the probability
of working for the full sample of women in cities, aged
20-47 and with at least a college degree. Column (2)
interacts the interaction term with an indicator for 3
for different age groups: 20-25, 26-30 and 31-36. The
regression estimated is: Yicjt = β0 + β1Treated[20 −
25]∗Med.Gradicjt+β2Treated[26−30]∗Med.Gradicjt+
β3Treated[31− 36] ∗Med.Gradicjt + β4Med.Gradicjt +
β5Xicjt + β6Age ∗Med.Gradicjt + β7Age2 + αj + αc +
αt +uicjt. The coefficients on each of the own terms are
included in the regression but not reported here.
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Treated x Med. Grads 0.3706∗∗ 8.3509∗
(0.1544) (4.5278)
[2.4001] [1.8443]
Treated Age[20-25] x Med Grad 0.5321
(0.4930)
[1.0823]
Treated Age[26-30] x Med Grad 0.3810∗
(0.1874)
[2.0345]
Treated Age[31-36] x Med Grad 0.4741∗∗∗
(0.1202)
[3.9623]
Observations 2484 2484 2484
R2 0.12 0.12 0.07
District FE Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y Y
Mean DV 10.02 10.02 83.5
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on the spousal income of married women
using equation 3.1. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level. ∗p <
0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Wild cluster bootstrap t statistics are reported in square brackets.
"Treated" women are those exposed to the policy change. Data are from repeated cross sections of
the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sample of women in cities, aged 20-47 and with at
least a college degree. The outcome in column (1) is the logarithm of spousal income, and in column
(2) the percentile of spousal income. Regressions include controls for age and age2 as well as the
age of the spouse. The coefficients on each of the own terms are included in the regression but not
reported here.
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Table 1.7: Selection on Parental Income
Middle or High High Middle
Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood
(1) (2) (3)
Women aged ≤ 25
Treated x Med. Grads 0.1394∗∗ 0.1579 0.2559∗∗
(0.0622) (0.0962) (0.1167)
N 2016 1059 1239
Mean DV 0.86 0.39 0.47
District FE Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y Y
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on the selection
on parental income estimated using equation 3.1. Evaluation of the selec-
tion of overall medical graduates is based on the pre-determined parental
characteristics of single graduates aged 25 or less, at which age the prob-
ability of marriage is still low (31%). Parental income is measured using
neighborhood income type as explained in Section 5. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level. "Treated" women are
those exposed to the policy change. Data are from repeated cross sec-
tions of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sample is of women
in cities, aged 20-47, with at least a college degree. All regressions control
for age and age2. The coefficients on each of the own terms are included
in the regression but not reported here.
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Treated x Med. Grads -0.2832∗∗∗ 0.3117∗∗∗ 0.2813∗∗
(0.0773) (0.1014) (0.1296)
N 3848 3848 1486
Oster’s δ 2.4, 37.8 1.53, 2.56 0.94, 2.02
I.(Non-middle Class)= 1
Treated x Med. Grads -0.0860∗ -0.0353 0.0229
(0.0495) (0.0547) (0.0915)
N 5204 5204 1733
District FE Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.75 0.64 0.41
Note: The table reports estimates the effects of the policy change using equation 3.1 separately
for middle class women and their complement (high and low income classes). The outcome in the
first column is the the probability of marriage, in the second the probability of working, and in the
third the probability of working as a single woman. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered
at the birth cohort level. "Treated" women are those exposed to the policy change. Data are from
repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sample is of women in cities,
aged 20-47, with at least a college degree. All regressions control for age and age2. The coefficients
on each of the own terms are included in the regression but not reported here. Oster’s δ is reported
for the middle class. The ratio represents the selection on unobservables relative to observables
necessary for a zero treatment effect. The first ratio is from a regression with no controls, the
second with the full set of controls and interactions.
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Treated x Med. Grads -0.3371∗∗∗ 0.1364 0.5351∗∗
(0.0637) (0.1328) (0.2430)
N 2327 2327 590
Oster’s δ 3.16, 8.28 1.32, 1.75 0.88, 2.31
I.(Mother Works)= 1
Treated x Med. Grads -0.4112∗ 0.2846 -0.2475
(0.2098) (0.3033) (0.3859)
N 169 169 124
I.(Other Doctors in Family)= 1
Treated x Med. Grads -0.3461∗ -0.0883 0.1393
(0.1994) (0.1860) (0.9705)
N 181 181 75
District FE Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.75 0.64 0.41
Note: The table reports estimates the effects of the policy change using equation 3.1 separately for women
from migrant families ("movers"), women with currently working mothers, and women with other doctors
in the family. The outcome in the first column is the the probability of marriage, in the second the
probability of working, and in the third the probability of working as a single woman. Standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level. "Treated" women are those exposed to the policy
change. Data are from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sample is
of women in cities, aged 20-47, with at least a college degree. All regressions control for age and age2.
The coefficients on each of the own terms are included in the regression but not reported here. Oster’s δ
is reported for the migrants. The ratio represents the selection on unobservables relative to observables
necessary for a zero treatment effect. The first ratio is from a regression with no controls, the second with
the full set of controls and interactions.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1·1: The population density of Pakistan
The map shows the population density of Pakistan as proxied by night lights data.
Source: Towards Data Science, 2019.
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0 5 10 15
Log(Income, 2010 PKR)
Med. Grad. Other College
The cumulative distribution of log(income) for medical graduates and other college
graduates, all old enough to not be affected by the policy change in 1976. Birth co-
horts used are from 1950-1975. The sample is otherwise restricted to be from cities,
have at least a college degree, and be aged 20-47. Data are from the Labor Force
Surveys, 1990-2012. Medical graduates earn more than other college graduates at
almost every percentile of the cumulative distribution.
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1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Birth Cohort
The graph shows the effect of the medical admissions policy change on the share of
female medical graduates. Data are administrative data from the Pakistan Statis-
tical Yearbook, various years. Circles represent the mean female share of medical
graduates in a given birth year, lines are local polynomial regressions fitted to the
data, with 95% confience intervals in gray. The medical school admissions policy
change was effective for individuals born in or after 1976, for whom the proportion
of women medical graduates is higher than for prior birth cohorts.
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1960 1970 1980 1990
Birth Cohort
(c) Post Graduate
The graph shows the female share of graduates in other college disciplines by birth
year. Data are from the Labor Force Surveys 1990-2012. Circles represent the mean
female share of graduates in that field in a given birth year, lines are fitted local
polynomials, and gray shaded areas are 95% confience intervals. The medical school
admissions policy change was effective for individuals born in or after 1976. The
graphs show no clear change in trend for women in other college disciplines.
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1961−1965 1966−1970 1971−1975 1976−1980 1981−1985
Birth Cohort
The figure shows event study estimates based on equation 3.2 for the
marriage probability of women in cities, born between 1961-1985, with
at least a college degree. Data are from repeated cross sections of the
Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010. Birth cohorts are grouped in 5 year
intervals. Each coefficient (circle) represents the marriage probability
of medical graduates relative to other college graduates for a given birth
cohort interval, and bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.
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1961−1965 1966−1970 1971−1975 1976−1980 1981−1985
Birth Cohort
The figure shows event study estimates based on equation 3.2 for the
probability of working for women in cities, born between 1961-1985,
with at least a college degree. Data are from repeated cross sections
of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010. Birth cohorts are grouped in 5
year intervals. Each coefficient (circle) represents the marriage proba-
bility of medical graduates relative to other college graduates for a given
birth cohort interval, and bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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The graphs represent the raw number of female medical graduates who
registered to work as doctors in each birth cohort. The figure on the
left (a) is for graduates registering with the basic M.B.B.S. degree, and
on the right (b) for those who specialize. Birth cohorts range from
1960-1985. Diamonds represent the mean number registering in a birth
cohort, and lines are local polynomial fits. Data are from the Pakistan
Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) website registration database.
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The graphs represent the female proportion of medical graduates who
registered to practice, NumberFemaleRegistering
TotalNumberRegistering c
, for each birth cohort c.
(a) uses data from the Labor Force Surveys, (b) uses PMDC registra-
tion data. Birth cohorts range from 1960-1985. Diamonds represent
the mean number registering in a birth cohort, and lines are local poly-
nomial fits.
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1961−1965 1966−1970 1971−1975 1976−1980 1981−1985
Birth Cohort
The figure shows event study estimates based on equation 3.2 for the
spousal income of married women in cities, born between 1961-1985,
with at least a college degree. Data are from repeated cross sections
of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010. Birth cohorts are grouped in 5
year intervals. Each coefficient (circle) represents the marriage proba-
bility of medical graduates relative to other college graduates for a given
birth cohort interval, and bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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(b) Demands for Men
The graphs represent the proportion of marriage advertisements that
ask for a medical graduate, or other educational type by birth year.
For visualization purposes the lines are local polynomial fits. Adver-
tisements were collected from a leading Pakistani publication, Dawn
Newspaper, for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. (a) is the
proportion of ads placed by men’s families searching for brides, and (b)
placed by women’s families searching for grooms.
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Chapter 2
The Welfare Consequences of Gender
Development Policies
2.1 Introduction
In the 21st century occupations are still segregated by gender, which affects how
they are structured, the goods and services they deliver, and how they are perceived.
For example, male dominated and female dominated occupations may be viewed as
requiring different skill sets (Goldin, 1990; Rendall, 2017; Galor and Weil, 1996) and
having different work life balances (Goldin, 2014; Wasserman, 2017). Medicine in
particular is a field where the gender ratio has rapidly been changing in the past 50
years, and where gender determines practices and perceptions (Zeltzer, 2020; Sarsons,
2017).
This paper uses the example of the medical sector to examine how an increased
proportion of women in a field affects the structure of the field as well as the it services
delivers. I study this question in the context of urban Pakistan, where pior to 1992
a policy rationed women out of medical school in favor of men. The proportion of
women in medical school was capped at 20%. Within this quota women were required
to score 7% more points than men to be admitted. The policy was changed in 1992,
following a court case by a group of women who alleged they were denied admission
to medical school despite scoring higher than several men. The cap and threshold
were deemed discriminatory and unconstitutional, and men and women granted equal
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access to medical school thereafter.
Occupational changes following a gender ratio shift are challenging to study be-
cause individuals sort into occupations, and the gender ratio is endogenous to this
sorting. For example, women may sort into occupations that allow for convenient
child care. The reform in Pakistani medical schools resulted in a plausibly exogenous
increase in the proportion of women in medicine, and allows the identification of the
effects of gender composition on an occupation.
I employ three data sets to explore the effects of the admissions reform on the
medical sector. First, I collect data on the universe of doctor registrations from the
Pakistan Medical and Dental Council’s (PMDC) website, which is an administra-
tive body that regulates medical schools and hospitals. The data provide a census
of 246, 000 doctors that registered to work between 1952-2018 and are useful for
understanding variation in the medical labor supply effects of the policy. Second,
I assemble a data set of repeated cross sections from the Labor Force Surveys of
Pakistan (1990-2012), which contain information on actual employment and wages
that are unavailable in the registration data. Finally, I examine downstream patient
outcomes using health care data available in the Demographic and Health Surveys of
Pakistan (DHS, 2006) and the Pakistan Integrated Health Survey (PIHS, 1998 and
2001).
I identify the effects of the reform using a reduced form regression discontinuity
approach. Birth cohorts born in 1976 or immediately after are more likely to be
exposed to reform because they were young enough at the time to prepare appropri-
ately for medical school. Meanwhile, those born right before 1976 were more likely
to have already made investments for their educational decisions. The graphs and
estimation presented in the paper aim to capture changes in outcomes for pre-reform
and post-reform cohorts around the birth cohort cutoff of 1976.
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I show first that removing the reform resulted in a sudden increase of 10 percentage
points in the female proportion of medical graduates, and a steady increase thereafter.
Pre-policy, on average 28% of medical graduates are women1, and after the policy-
change the proportion rises to 55%. A third of the increase occured in the single
year of the policy change. This suggests that the old admissions policy significantly
distorted medical school admissions.
Prior to the reform, women comprised a small proportion of doctors registering
to practice. Specialists were largely confined to a few fields such as gynaecology and
paediatrics, and practiced mainly in cities. Almost all specialists (95%) and 57% of
those with a bachelors in medicine (MBBS) had career durations of at least 15 years.
The reform paved the way for an increased female proportion of doctors register-
ing to work. While there was almost no change in the total number of registrations,
the proportion of female registrations abruptly increased and remained high. This
suggests that there was pass through from the increased proportion of women in med-
ical schools to practicing registrations. The proportion of women doctors registering
among the cumulative doctor registrations since 1952 is smaller, but also increased.
The second major change of the reform was that women entered specialties where
they were non-existent before. There is evidence that women displaced men to some
extent in fields such as cardiology and general surgery. Recent research suggests
that women doctors achieve greater patient satisfaction than their male counterparts,
perhaps because they are more likely to practice evidence-based medicine, or because
they communicate better (Yusuke, 2017). A changing gender ratio in these specialties
could therefore improve patients’ overall experience.
The structure of the medical sector also changed in terms of the average career
tenure of practitioners. A slightly smaller proportion of post reform doctors had an
1. It exceeds the 20% cap because of an all female medical school exempt from the old policy,
possibly imperfect compliance, or women having higher graduation rates than men.
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active license after 10 and after 15 years than before. For example, the proportion
of post-reform MBBS women practioners active for 15 dropped to 54% from 57%.
Surprisingly, women and men both contributed to this trend. While women are more
likely to drop out after marriage, men may drop out because they move to practice
abroad, face increased competition from women in medicine, or because of the growth
of other lucrative fields. Overall, one consequence of this finding is that patients may
not have very long term relationships with their doctors, be they female or male
practitioners.
The feminization of medicine in a developing country may result in fewer rural
doctors, since women are less likely to practice in rural areas than men. Registration
patterns reveal that women doctors of any qualification are almost 10 percentage
points more likely to register in one of the ten largest cities of Pakistan than their
male counterparts. Post-reform, the growth in women doctors in Pakistan was almost
exclusive to urban areas. The propensity to practice in urban areas did not change,
therefore, increasing the number of women in medical school led to more women
doctors in urban areas. What is even more surprising is that the number of doctors
in rural areas did not actually decrease as a consequence. Health care in rural districts
experienced very little, if any, change after the new medical schools’ admission policy.
One reason could be that doctors already practicing in rural areas did not leave or
retire, but there was a decrease in the number of new doctors in rural areas.
I tie these findings together by examining how changes in the medical sector affect
two aspects of patient care: the experience of first time mothers, as well as young chil-
dren. Pregnant women tend to prefer female doctors (Alqufly et al., 2019) and may
benefit from the reform. Alternatively, pregnant women in rural areas where women
are less likely to work may suffer from the reform. In an OLS regression that examines
the effect of the reform on pregnant womens’ experiencses, I find no significant effects
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on child mortality, doctor presence for prenatal care, delivery and post-delivery check-
ups for women pregnant in the years immediately around the reform. Interacting the
post reform indicator with being an urban district, which received most new women
doctors, yields positive but insignificant results. The evidence is at most suggestive
that women patients were more likely to utilize healthcare in urban areas when the
proportion of women doctors increased.
One reason for these findings could be that there are still few women doctors
relative to the cumulative body of doctors, and that changes downstream take more
time to be visible. Another could be that it takes more time for patients’ to change
their healthcare utilization patterns.
My paper contributes to the literature by first examining how a changing gender
ratio in an occupation affects its structure, and the quality of goods and servives
provided. Medicine has become increasingly popular among women across the globe
(Minckas et al., 2019), making my findings relevant to a range of contexts.
This paper is also important from a policy perspective. Gender development
policies are an important pillar of millenium development goals (United Nations,
Millennium Development Goals2). Consequently, countries have implemented policies
over time to encourage women’s education and labor force participation with various
degrees of success. Where women’s participation is encouraged at the expense of
men’s participation, these policies may have far reaching consequences. Women and
men work in different ways, and the quality and quantity of the services or goods
they deliver can differ. I show that although a gender development policy crowded
men out of medicine in favor of women in the Pakistani context, downstream effects
on one aspect of patient care are not substantial at this stage.
The PMDC has also been a vocal proponent of reinstating an entry cap on female
entry into medical school. The main reason is that female medical graduates are
2. https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml
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less likely to work than male medical graduates on both the intensive and extensive
margins.
The World Health Organization recommends a physician to population ratio of
23:10,000, which is substantially higher than the ratio of 7.8: 10,000 in Pakistan. In
comparison, in the US, there are 22 physicians per 10,000 population (World Health
Organization). The need for working doctors in the health care system raises the
stakes for admitting medical graduates that are likely to work. My paper contributes
to this debate by quantifying structural changes in where and how doctors work post-
reform. Although some features of the medical sector changed, I do not find a large
change in the total number of doctors registering to practice.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide contextual
background and institutional details. In section 3, I discuss my estimation and data,
followed by results in section 4. I conclude in section 5.
2.2 Background
Healthcare in Pakistan is based on a system of public and private institutions, in-
cluding government health departments, the private sector, and non-governmental
insititutions. Most management is conducted vertically through disease specific in-
stitutions. The system is also known to have inequalities between urban and rural
areas, with most health facilities concentrated in large cities. In rural areas where
hospitals are scarce, the public sector is the main provider of health care through a
system of basic health units and rural health centers.
With this background, medical schools play a very important role in providing
trained professionals to the health care system. In the sections below I describe the
structure and importance of medical schools, as well as the admissions policy reform
they experienced in 1992.
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Medical School The process of applying to medical school itself is simple but
rigorous. Prior to applying, students select the appropriate pre-college subjects and
take high school board examinations. They apply to medical school or another college
at the end of high school. Addtionally, an entrance test is required for admission.
According to the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC)3 website, the single
most important determinant of admission is the entrance exam score which accounts
for 50% of the overall candidate score, followed by high school grades (40%) and
middle school grades (10%). Some schools may conduct interviews in the final rounds
of the admissions process, but the PMDC website does not indicate these as very
important or uniformly practiced. After the typical five years of medical school,
medical graduates can register to practice with their basic M.B.B.S degree, or pursue
a residency and fellowship.
Most colleges, medical or otherwise, are owned either publically or privately. Pub-
lic medical school can be highly subsidized, especially for high scoring students who
are eligible for scholarships. The typical cost of a private school is 2-3 times that of
a public school4. There is more parity in the time to complete school: public and
private medical schools typically take 5 years to complete, and other degree colleges
4 years to complete. In 1992, at the time of the policy change, there were 2 pri-
vate medical colleges and 17 public medical colleges. Since the mid-2000s Pakistan
has witnessed a large growth in the number of medical schools, especially in private
schools. Because this growth can interact with the effects of the 1992 policy change,
I do not include any birth cohorts that would be exposed to the rapid expansion of
medical schools in the mid-2000s.
3. The administrative body that regulates medical schools.
4. Sources: Prospectus’ of Aga Khan Medical College, Karachi Medical and Dental College, La-
hore University of Management Sciences, Karachi University.
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The Policy Change Due to the shortage of women doctors in particular after
Pakistan’s independence in 1947, a women’s medical college with an initial class size
of 36 was established in 1948 (Fatima Jinnah Medical College). As the shortage of
women doctors continued, 20% of seats in all other public and private medical colleges
were reserved for female students, and the remaining 80% reserved for male students.
As the demand for female medical education increased, however, the number of female
applicants outgrew the number of reserved seats (Masood, 2019). Further, in the early
1980s, medical education quality concerns led to a reduction in the total number of
medical seats. This reduction differentially affected women, and the score threshold
for women’s admission was made 7% higher than for men5 (Andrabi and Singh, 2015).
The turning point for women’s presence in medical school arrived in 1989 when
a group of women led by Shrin Munir filed a case against the old admissions policy,
alleging that they were denied admission despite scoring higher than several men.
A court ruling decreed that the admissions policy was unconstitutional, stating that
"the selection procedures violated [sections of] the Pakistani Constitution prohibiting
discrimination [...] on the basis of sex" (Shrin Munir and others v. Government of
Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another (PLD 1990 SC 295)6. Subse-
quently, the admissions policy was changed in 1991 to being based purely on merit.
For cohorts admitted in 1992 and thereafter, women and men had an equal opportu-
nity of being admitted.
After the change in admissions policy, the proportion of women in medical school
rapidly increased. I plot the female fraction of medical graduates using administrative
data in figure 2·1 and labor force survey data in figure A.1 in the Appendix. The
points represent the proportion of female doctors (left hand scale) for a given birth
cohort, the lines are local polynomial fits. Women born in or after 1976 were young
5. The corresponding score numbers are 820 and 731 points respectively.
6. Available through: https://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/pld-1990-sc-295/
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enough at the time of policy removal to be affected by the equal opportunity it
provided. At that age they would still have the time to select pre-medical subjects,
study and take the entrance exam. Women born before 1976 are more likely to have
completed their educational decisions when the policy was changed, and are less likely
to be affected. Notably, the proportion of women in medical school pre-policy change
exceeds 20% in the administrative data, which may be because of the presence of a
women’s only school, or possibly due to imperfect compliance, or men being more
likely to drop out of medical school. Unfortunately, without further data it is difficult
to ascertain which of those is the main explanation. Even though the constraint was
not strict pre-policy change, there is a noticeable increase in female proportion of
medical graduates for birth cohorts starting in 1976. In the administrative data the
increase is of 10 percentage points, after which the proportion rises steadily. Pre-
policy, on average 28% of medical graduates are women, and after the policy-change
the proportion rises to 55%. A third of the increase occured in the single year of the
policy change. This suggests that the old admissions policy substantially distorted
medical admissions, and meaningfully restricted women’s access to medical school.
Figure 2·2 plots the female share of medical graduates by birth cohort for other
fields reported in the labor force surveys for comparison. These fields are: general
Bachelors’ degrees, engineering degrees and post graduate (for example, Masters)
degrees. Although there was an increasing trend in female education across fields,
there is no clear jump around the 1976 birth cohort observed in fields that did not
experience a sudden reduction in barriers to entry.
Over time, medical schools have reported that growth in the number of female
medical students has been exponential and that male medical graduates are being
crowded out. For example, in 2014 one of the largest medical schools in Karachi
reported that 70% of its students were women 7. Table A.1 in the Appendix examines
7. Dawn News, 2014.
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crowd out of males in medical schools after the change in admissions. The data
are from the Labor Force Surverys (1990-2012), described below, collapsed to the
educational x birth cohort x city level. I regress the number of male medical graduates
on the number of female graduates interacted with being from a post-policy birth
cohort, the number of female medical graduates, and birth cohort and city fixed
effects. The main coefficient of interest is on the interaction term which indicates
that increasing the number of female medical students by two after the policy change
leads to about one less male medical student.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the main data sources and identification strategy.
2.3.1 Data
Doctors’ Registration Data I use information on medical graduates’ registration
data to look at location and specialization patterns. This data was obtained from the
Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) website. A medical doctor is required
to register with the PMDC if they intend to practice in any capacity in the country.
The data provide a census of 246, 000 registering doctors over the years 1952-2018.
Other information includes the city and school the degree was obtained from, and
specialization. The advantage of these data are the large number of observations,
the lack of sampling variation because they cover all registrations, and the details of
registration patterns over a long period of time and space.
Labor Force Data The data for marriage, labor force outcomes, and educational
attainment are from the Labor Force Surveys of Pakistan. I create a data set of
repeated cross sections from 13 survey rounds between the years 1990 and 2012.
Although the survey collects data on individuals from urban, semi-urban and rural
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populations from every province, I restrict my sample to cities because this is where
the population most affected by the policy change resides, as the previous section
on distance variation demonstrates. For similar reasons, I restrict my sample to
individuals with greater than a high school education, and born after 1965 (Pakistan
became an independent country in 1947, and data on earlier birth cohorts is noisy).
Finally I exclude individuals younger than 20 because they are likely to not have
reached the highest level of educational attainment they will attain in their life.
Table 3.1 provides sample summary statistics for women. Even in this urban sam-
ple, only 4% have a medical degree, which speaks to the elite status of medical school.
Most college going women obtain a non-medical and non-engineering degree. This
includes every other kind of bachelor’s degree, from biology and history to business
administration8. Moving to non-educational characteristics, about two thirds of the
women are married when observed, and at 0.3% divorce is an extremely rare event. I
define the probability of working as indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual
reported working at least 1 hour in the past week for a pay or salary, for any profit
or family gain, or if they have a job or own enterprise that they will return to within
a month. It does not include working otherwise in a family farm or family business
(not for a monetary gain)9. 23% of college educated women report working using
this definition, which is low by developed country standards but not relative to other
developing countries (Pande, 2015). Monthly wage earnings are deflated to 2010 USD
using the CPI deflator provided by Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 10, and
the average wage of 210 USD monthly corresponds roughly to the wage of a middle
class individual.
Health Survey Data Two data sets provide health outcomes for mothers’ ex-
perience post-reform. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS, 2006) provide
8. 86% of women have less than a college degree.
9. The results are unchanged if I include this category in the definition of working.
10. FRED deflation data available here: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOE01PKA086NWDB
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retrospective birth histories for up to twenty births which can be used to examine
effects on infant mortality. The Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS, 1998
and 2001) are surveys with a smaller sample size that are conducted more frequently
than the DHS. As a result, they provide more detailed information on prenatal care
and the delivery of children around the reform. The cutoff of interest is the year 1997,
when the first class of medical graduates admitted post reform would join the labor
force. I restrict the sample in each survey to infants born immediately around the
cutoff (between 1996-2000) and their mothers. Other changes in the environment are
less likely to bias results in a narrow window around the cutoff. I further restrict the
sample to the experience of first time mothers. First time mothers are less likely to be
informed by prior experinces, and more dependent on the health care available, than
women having higher order births. Their experience would be particularly reflective
of health care quality.
2.3.2 Identification Strategy
The policy change in 1992 substantially decreased barriers to entry for women apply-
ing to medical school, and it’s benefit for an individual varied exogenously based on
her birth cohort.
A woman is more likely to be affected by the reform if in 1992 she was young to
complete medical school pre-requisites, and study for and take an entrance test. I use
the year of birth to create an indicator for if a woman is likely to be exposed. If she
is aged 16 or less at the time of the policy in 1992 (born in or after 1976), she has a
greater opportunity to attend medical school than cohorts before her did.
The cutoff in exposure over birth cohorts lends itself to a regression discontinuity
design for examining the effects of the reform. To estimate the change in outcomes
for individuals immediately before and after the birth cohort 1976, I parametrically
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estimate
Yic = β0 + β1Postic + β2f(Y earsSince)ic
β3Posticxf(Y earsSince)ic + αs + uic
(2.1)
Yic is an outcome for individual i and born in birth cohort c. Post is an indicator
for being born in a birth cohort more likely to be exposed to the reform (in or after
1976), f(Years Since) is a third order polynomial capturing the distance between an
individual’s birth cohort and the 1976 birth cohort. This is the running variable for
the regression discontinuity. Finally, αs are fixed effects for the school of an individ-
ual’s final degree, and uic is a disturbance term that captures unobserved variables
which affect the outcome. School fixed effects account for differences between newer
and older schools, as well as school specific registration histories. The regressions
are clustered at the years since level. Optimal bandwidths are calculated using the
optimal bandwidth selector from Calonico et al. (2014).
The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures changes in registration patterns
immediately around the reform.
My estimation rests on the identification assumption of the treatment, exposure
to the reform, being randomly assigned. Then individuals exposed to the reform can
be compared to those that just missed it. Birth year itself is plausibly random; the
reform is unlikely to have been anticipated 16 years in advance. The concern would
be if certain types of individuals delayed decision making because they anticipated
the policy, and hence manipulated treatment.
By all accounts the policy was unanticipated by the general public, and does not
appear to have received wide coverage in newspapers at the time. It began as a case in
a single province, and the ruling that followed was then carried out for the remaining
provinces as well. If the policy change was unanticipated by individuals, they would
77
not be selected or invest differently than those after the 1976 cutoff.
Other policy or economic changes around 1992 could bias my results as well. In
the 2000s there was a growth spurt in private schools in Pakistan to meet the rising
demand of a medical education. This is likely to have its own effect on medical
graduates, since different types of individuals go to private versus public schools. To
isolate the effect of the policy from the effect of any growth spurt, I exclude birth
cohorts that would be exposed to the growth in private medical schools, and also
include school fixed effects in all specifications.
Finally, delayed decision making in medical school application, or grade repetition,
would imply that some individuals currently in pre-policy change cohorts could be ex-
posed to the policy in some ways. This is a common problem for analyses that rely on
the timing of decison making, and typically lead to a downwards bias in the estimate
because some individuals in the control group also experience treatment. This makes
the difference in outcomes between the post and pre-reform women smaller than it
truly is. Typically individuals finish high school by age 18 or 19, and then attend
the college they have chosen. According to UNESCO Institute Statistics (2010), the
percentage of repeaters for secondary school was 2.1% in 2008, which implies that
not a great number of women born before 1976 were exposed to the reform.
2.4 Results
This section presents how the reform affected the medical field and patient health care.
The outcomes examined are the number of doctors (both registered and working),
the proportion of women in specific specialities, the spatial distribution of registering
doctors, and their career tenure.
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2.4.1 Labor Force Participation
I begin by analyzing how the female number and proportion of registering doctors
changed using doctor registration data from the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council
(PMDC). These data contain information on every medical graduate that registered
to practice as a doctor. Figure 2·4 plots the number of women that register to pratice
with a bachelors in medicine (MBBS) degree in panel A, and with a specialized
degree panel B. Each point represents the number of women medical graduates born
in a given year that registered to practice. The number of women registering with
a basic medical degree jumped from about 1000 to 1500 for treated cohorts, and
increased steadily thereafter. The same is true for women registering to practice after
specializing, but here the numbers are smaller and indicate that many more women
practice with their basic degree. At least in absolute terms, a greater number of
female medical students translated into a greater number of female medical doctors.
How much did the increase in the number of female doctors contribute to the pop-
ulation of registering doctors? Figure 2·5 plots the female proportion of registering
medical graduates (NumberFemaleRegistering
TotalNumberRegistering
) in panels C and D. Panel C is constructed
using LFS data plots individuals who actually report working, while panel D uses
PMDC data and plots registrations. While the labor force survey results are nois-
ier, both graphs show evidence that the the medical profession became increasingly
feminized after the reform. While it is true that registrations do not always lead to
individuals working, the increase in proportion occurs in both registrations and actual
labor force participation.
Finally, figure A.1 in the Appendix plots the marginal change in female proportion
of registrations (NumberFemaleRegistrations
TotalNumberRegistrations c
, where c is birth cohort), with the changes
relative to the cumulative number of registrations by birth cohort
( NumberFemaleRegistrations
TotalNumberRegistrationsUptoCohort c
). While the increase in female registrations is small
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relative to the cumulative population of doctors, there is still a visible increase in
female proportions after the birth cohort of 1976.
Figure 2·6 examines if there was a change in the total number of doctors after
the reform (for example, because women doctors may work less). Post-reform, there
is no significant increase or decrease in the total number of registrations in the left
panel. In the right panel, I find that the proportion of admitted medical students
who register also did not decrease or increase. This could partly be due to a fixed
supply of hospitals and clinincs at which doctors could practice after registering. The
female proportion of registrations increased simply because the female proportion of
medical graduates increased. However, more women in medical school did not lower
the doctor registration rate and leave available doctor positions unfilled.
The graph also plots the total number of medical school enrollments. Surprisingly,
only a small proportion of those admitted to medical school eventually register to
practice. A few reasons could be dropping out, not finishing a house job, moving
abroad, being unable to work in cities, marrying or changing professions. House job
pay is relatively low in Pakistan, especially relative to wages in other professions, and
in recent years this may be a factor that discourages men from working domestically
as doctors.
2.4.2 Career Tenure of Medical Doctors
Career tenure is indicative of how long medical graduates practice. Doctors with
longer tenures can foster longer patient doctor relationships. I examine the effect of
the reform on doctor tenure using registration data. These data provide the year at
which a doctor’s medical license was first issued, and the year it is valid till. Since
a medical license typically needs renewal every five years, the difference between the
initial issue date and the validity date provide an estimate of the number of years a
doctor has an active license and is practicing for.
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I construct three indicators for tenure length: having an active license for at least
5 years, at least 10 years, and at least 15 years. The medical data are until 2018,
therefore I restrict them to an issue date of at most 2003 for individuals to have the
time to activate their license at 15 years. A medical graduate who practices for 20
years will have an active license for 15 or more years, while a medical graduate who
stops practicing after 4 years will not have an active license for any of the indicators.
Figure 2·11 plots the three indicators separately for MBBS doctors in the left
panel. For specialists I plot the indicators for ten and fifteen years only, as the length
of specialists’ training makes a 5 year license very likely. Most specialists continue to
have an active license for at least 15 years, although there is a slight decrease post
reform in every indicator, suggesting career tenure decreased marginally (table 2.1).
Those practicing with a MBBS have a lower level of retention than specialists.
About 80% of those that register with a MBBS degree are active for 5 or more years,
about 70% for 10 or more years, and 60% for 15 or more years. Every five years there
is a 10 percentage point decrease in those that remain active pre-reform. Post-reform,
there is little change at the 5 year mark, but a slight decrease at the 10 year mark.
In table 2.1, while the coefficient for being active for 10 or more years is negative, it
is small and statistically insignificant.
Rules regarding license registration are such that medical graduates are given a
year long temporary license after graduating and while completing on the job training.
After this, they are granted a permanent license that is renewed every five years. The
results suggest that most MBBS doctors continue to register after their one year
training, but a greater proportion than before the reform became inactive 15 years
after graduating.
Figure 2·12 decomposes these graphs by gender for those practicing with a MBBS
degree. Surprisingly, men and women both have a lower proportion post-reform that
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remain active after 10 and 15 years, although the decrease is slightly larger and more
sustained for women. Anecdotally, common reasons for becoming inactive may be
moving abroad, leaving the labor force due to marriage, and changing professions.
2.4.3 The Spatial Distribution of Medical Doctors
Figure 2·8 plots the total number of doctors in urban and rural areas, as well as the
number of male and female doctors in each. The most striking feature of the graphs
is that the increase in doctors post-reform is almost exclusively in urban areas. Rural
areas experience a much smaller increase in doctors. Further, the increase is comprised
of new women doctors and reflects the changed composition in medical schools.
In figure 2·10 I plot the proprortion of medical graduates registering to work in
the ten largest cities of Pakistan, which constitute the major urban centers in the
country 11.
On average, female medical graduates are more likely to register in big cities than
men. The likelihood that a woman specialist registers in a city is about 90% pre-
reform and has decreased slightly birth cohort. Men are 10 percentage points more
likely to register in rural areas than women. However, the probability of practicing
in an urban area did not change much around the reform itself, and instead has
gradually decreased by birth cohort (figure 2·10).
Doctors registering with a MBBS and those specializing show similar patterns
in their spatial distribution. Changes post-reform are quantified using a regression
discontinuity approach in table 2.2. Although not statistically significant, the table
highlights that male specialists were 3 percentage points less likely to register in
big cities post-reform. This could be evidence of a crowd out of male specialists
in urban areas towards less urban areas. Women doctors with a basic degree were
11. These include: Karachi, Hyderabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot,
Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad
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also marginally less likely to register in large urban areas, which could be because
of growing numbers of women from peri-urban areas attending medical school. The
majority of women doctors practicing in rural areas received their degree from medical
schools in smaller cities or rural areas.
2.4.4 The Gender Composition of Specializations
Female and male medical graduates specialize in different fields, and this could affect
the quality of care provided within specializations. Figure 2·7 plots the female pro-
portion of a specialty and the relative popularity of that speciality among medical
graduates for six specific specialities.
In panel A, pre-reform cohorts of gynaecologists are mostly women, which is con-
sistent with the conservative setting. Post reform, the female proportion of gynae-
cologists is effectively 1. The fact that the female proportion of gynaecologists did
not increase very much, but gynaecology became more popular as a field suggests
that the absolute number of gynaecologists increased relative to the number of total
doctors.
At another extreme is general surgery, where ex-ante less than 10% of specialists
were women. Post-reform, there is a modest increase in the female proportion of
general surgeons, and the increase appears to continue over latter birth cohorts.
The size of the increase appears greater for fields with an ex-ante moderate propor-
tion of women, such as in paediatrics, as opposed to fields with a low initial proportion
of women (such as surgery), or fields that are saturated (gynaecology).
For most fields, the general popularity of the specialty among doctors
(NumberRegisteredInternists
TotalNumberRegistered
) remains constant and experienced no major change in the
proportion of medical graduates specializing in these fields. Women’s proportion in
the specialty increased, however, and the two facts together suggest that women may
be displacing men in those specialities.
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Table 2.3 substantiates the relationships in the figure 2·7 using a regression dis-
continuity approach. The most substantial gender composition changes of the fields
shown are in cardiology, paediatrics and anaesthesiology. Post reform, the share of
female cardiologists increases by 25 percentage points (column 3), which is more than
twice the overall proportion of women cardiologists. As in the graphs, fields that did
not experience substantial changes include surgery, and gynaecology.
2.4.5 Health Care Effects
In this section I examine the effects of a feminized medical labor force on patient care
downstream. Maternal and child health care is especially unpderprovided in rural
areas, which comprise 60% of the popular. In recent years Pakistan has taken steps
to bridge the gap in maternal and child care between urban and rural areas. This
section examines if women doctors helped or heeded this effort.
Table A.1 in the Appendix examines effects on infant mortality and place of death
in a simple OLS framework where patient outcomes are regressed on an indicator for
being a patient immediately after the reform. Both outcomes are constructed using
the retrospective birth histories in the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey
(2006). The first medical graduates affected by the reform finished medical school in
1997. Therefore, infants born immediately after 1997 are those born in infant cohorts
affected by the reform ("post"), while those born immediately before correspond to
pre-reform infant cohorts.
The table shows results from a simple OLS estimation that compares infants
born in post-reform cohorts to those in pre-reform cohorts. The first, in particular,
is likely to be affected if there is a change in the probability of a doctor treating
mothers. Observable confounders such as maternal age, education, child gender,
district and year fixed effects are included as covariates. I find no significant effects
on the probability an infant is alive, or whether the infant was being cared for in
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a hospital at the time of death. Instead, maternal age and education are the most
important factors determining outcomes.
Table 2.4 employs additional information in the Pakisan Integrated Health Surveys
(1998, 2001) to examine the probability of receiving prenatal care, and of a doctor
being present for prenatal care, for delivery, and for post-delivery checkups. The
results imply that infants born after 1997 is 0.93 percentage points more likely to be
delivered by a medical doctor than a infant born in 1997 or earlier. However, the
results are not statistically significant.
Finally, I extend the anaylsis by interacting a child being born in the post period
with being in an urban district, since urban districts experienced a greater entry of
women in medicine. Mothers in districts with a higher proportion of women doctors
may find more doctors that they feel comfortable being treated by, and would benefit
from a feminized labor force.
Yicjt = β0 + β1(Posticjt ∗ Urbanj) + β2Posticjt + β3Urbanj
+γX + αt + uicjt
(2.2)
which examines outcomes for woman i with a child born in child birth cohort c,
residing in district j and observed in survey year t. Post equals 1 if an individual is
a patient in 1998 or 1999, and equals 0 if they are a patient in 1996, 1997. Urban is
an indicator as well, and equals 1 if the patient lived in one of the largest ten cities
of Pakistan. I estimate the basic differences in differences, as well as a version with
survey year fixed effects, and controls for mothers’ age, education and the child’s
gender.
Table 2.5 reports the results. Estimated coefficients capture the effect of the
changing gender composition of the medical labor force at the district level. The
results imply that mothers who had first borns immediately after 1997 in districts
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with relatively more women doctors were more likely to give birth in the presence of
a medical doctor. However, introducing controls reduces the statistical significance
of these results. Table 2.6 conducts this exercise for childrens’ immunization and
diarrhea treatment. Again, while the results without controls are suggestive of greater
health care utilization, with controls there are no significant changes.
The insignificant results may be that there are still few women doctors relative
to the cumulative body of doctors, and that changes downstream take more time to
be visible. Another could be that it takes more time for patients’ to change their
healthcare utilization patterns. For example, if families usually rely on community
workers to immunize their children, they may not change their behavior immediately
after the reform. It may even take them time to realize their likelihood of interacting
with a female doctor has increased.
2.5 Conclusion
In this project I study the effects of an increasingly feminized medical labor force on
structual changes in the profession, and on patient outcomes. I document first that
the more women in medical school translate into more women registering as doctors,
leading to a "feminized" labor force.
This feminizing of the labor force results in women entering specialties where
they were previously non-existent. While there is no decrease in the totaly number of
registrations, there is a very slight decrease in the tenure of MBBS doctors. Finally,
most of the increase in women doctors is in urban areas.
Next, I examine the effect of these structural changes on patient outcomes down-
stream, focusing on the experience of mothers and young children. I find suggestive
but insignificant impacts on the feminization of doctors on infant mortality, recieving
prenatal care, and the presence or a doctor during delivery. These results may be
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because more time may be required for medical labor force changes to affect patient
outcomes.
My findings are important from a policy perspective because they imply that
although allowing more women into medical school affects the structure of the medical
labor force, there is no evidence to suggest adverse effects on the total number of
doctors, as well as doctors in rural areas.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Changes in Career Tenure: Regression Discontinuity
Probability(Active License)
≥ 5 yr ≥ 10 yr ≥ 15 yr ≥ 10 yr ≥ 15 yr
RD_Estimate 0.0028 -0.0088 0.0100 -0.0022 0.0554
(0.0146) (0.0167) (0.0247) (0.0020) (0.0391)
Observations 76479 76479 76479 32186 32186
Sample MBBS MBBS MBBS Specialists Specialists
Mean DV 0.79 0.66 0.47 0.98 0.94
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the years since re-
form cluster level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcome is the
probability that a doctor’s license is active for at least the given num-
ber of years. Post is an indicator for being born in cohorts exposed
to the reform. The sample is of doctors born between 1965 and 1988.
The RD specification uses a bandwith of 10 years, and polynomial of
degree 1.
Table 2.2: Changes in the Proportion Registering in Large
Cities: Regression Discontinuity
Probability(Register in an Urban Area)
RD_Estimate 0.0063 -0.0204 -0.0344 0.0059
(0.0198) (0.0249) (0.0224) (0.0201)
Observations 32633 28219 19080 11092
Sample Men Women Men Women
Mean DV 0.73 0.86 0.74 0.88
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
years since reform cluster level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***
p<.01. The outcome is the probability that a doctor
registers to practice in one of the ten largest cities of
Pakistan. Post is an indicator for being born in cohorts
exposed to the reform. The sample is of doctors born
between 1965-1988. The RD specification uses a band-
with of 10 years, and polynomial of degree 1.
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Table 2.3: Changes in Specialization: Regression Discontinuity
Probability(Female Specialist)
Gynaecology Paediatrics Cardiology Surgery Medicine Anaesthesia
RD_Estimate 0.0122 0.0894∗ 0.1474∗∗∗ 0.0346 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.1519∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0505) (0.0287) (0.0230) (0.0223) (0.0261)
Observations 4461 1583 1031 4944 4253 1735
Mean DV 0.98 0.40 0.10 0.11 0.25 0.18
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the years since reform cluster level. *
p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcomes are indicators equalling 1 if a specialist is a
female and 0 otherwise (corresponding to NumberFemaleSpecialists
NumberSpecialists c
). Post is an indicator for
being born in cohorts exposed to the reform. The sample is of doctors born between 1965
and 1988. All regressions include fixed effects for the school of last degree and years since
reform. The RD specification uses a bandwith of 10 years, and polynomial of degree 1.
Table 2.4: Doctor Presence for Mothers Post-Reform
Prenatal Doctor Present for
Prenatal Delivery Post-Delivery
Post Birth Year 0.0055 0.0069 0.0055 -0.0529
(0.0183) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0493)
Observations 2902 2030 2902 619
R2 0.23 0.11 0.31 0.21
F 27.8 3.1 34.3 1.0
Mean DV 0.23 0.82 0.14 0.70
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcomes are the probability a
woman receives prenatal care, that a doctor is present for prenatal
care, delivery and post-delivery checkups. Sample is for mothers of
first born children born between 1996-2000. The variable post equals
1 if a child is born after 1997. All regressions include survey year and
district fixed effects, as well as controls for the mother’s age, years of
education, and child sex.
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Table 2.5: Doctor Availability in Urban Areas Post-Reform: Mothers’
Outcomes
Doctor Present for
Prenatal Delivery Prenatal Delivery
Post x Urban -0.0026 0.0230∗∗ 0.0101 0.0254
(0.0178) (0.0105) (0.0252) (0.0280)
Observations 7158 21399 3160 4600
R2 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.17
F 49.6 620.7 7.3 157.0
Mean DV 0.84 0.18 0.84 0.18
Controls N N Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the PIHS
cluster level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcomes are
the probability a woman that a doctor is present for prenatal
care and delivery. The sample is of mothers of first born chil-
dren born between 1996-2000. The variable post equals 1 for
years after 1997. Columns 3-4 include survey year fixed effects,
as well as controls for the mother’s age, years of education.
Table 2.6: Doctor Availability in Urban Areas Post-Reform: Child Outcomes
Immunized Doctor Present for Immunized Doctor Present for
Immunization Diarrhea Treatment Immunization Diarrhea Treatment
Post x Urban 0.0298∗ 0.0258 0.0272 0.0257 0.0247 0.0282
(0.0164) (0.0178) (0.0342) (0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0347)
Observations 22447 22441 2775 22447 22441 2775
R2 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02
F 5.3 11.2 5.2 71.9 17.2 5.8
Mean DV 0.4 0.041 0.8 0.4 0.041 0.8
Controls N N N Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the PIHS cluster level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The
outcomes are the probability a woman that a doctor is present for prenatal care and delivery. The sample is of
mothers of children born between 1996-2000. The variable post equals 1 for years after 1997. Columns 3-4 include
survey year fixed effects, as well as controls for the mother’s age, years of education. Immunized equals 1 if the child
has an immunization card. Doctor present for immunization is for the most recent immunization, and doctor present
for diarrhea is for diarrhea cases in the past 30 days.
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2.7 Figures
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The graph shows the effect of the medical admissions policy change on the share of
female medical graduates. Data are administrative data from the Pakistan Statis-
tical Yearbook, various years. Circles represent the mean female share of medical
graduates in a given birth year, lines are local polynomial regressions fitted to the
data, with 95% confience intervals in gray. The medical school admissions policy
change was effective for individuals born in or after 1976, for whom the proportion
of women medical graduates is higher than for prior birth cohorts.
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(c) Post Graduate
The graph shows the female share of graduates in other college disciplines by birth
year. Data are from the Labor Force Surveys 1990-2012. Circles represent the mean
female share of graduates in that field in a given birth year, lines are fitted local
polynomials, and gray shaded areas are 95% confience intervals. The medical school
admissions policy change was effective for individuals born in or after 1976. The
graphs show no clear change in trend for women in other college disciplines.
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1960 1970 1980 1990
Birth Cohort
The graph shows the effect of the medical admissions policy change on
the share of female medical graduates. Data are from repeated cross
sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2012. Circles represent the
mean female share of medical graduates in a given birth year, lines
are local polynomial regressions fitted to the data, with 95% confience
intervals in gray. The medical school admissions policy change was
effective for individuals born in or after 1976, for whom the proportion
of women medical graduates is higher than for prior birth cohorts.
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The graphs represent the raw number of female medical graduates who
registered to work as doctors in each birth cohort. The figure on the
left (a) is for graduates registering with the basic M.B.B.S. degree, and
on the right (b) for those who specialize. Birth cohorts range from
1960-1985. Diamonds represent the mean number registering in a birth
cohort, and lines are local polynomial fits. Data are from the Pakistan
Medical and Dental Council (PMDC) website registration database.
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Birth Year
Female
(a) Labor Force Data (b) PMDC Data
The graphs represent the female proportion of medical graduates who
registered to practice, NumberFemaleRegistering
TotalNumberRegistering c
, for each birth cohort c.
(a) uses data from the Labor Force Surveys, (b) uses PMDC registra-
tion data. Birth cohorts range from 1960-1985. Diamonds represent
the mean number registering in a birth cohort, and lines are local poly-
nomial fits.
Figure 2·6: The Total Number of Doctor Registrations
(a) Number Register (b) Proportion Register
Graph (a) shows the total number of registrations by birth cohort. Graph (b) represents the proportion
of enrolled medical students that register NumberRegister
NumberEnrolled c
, for each birth cohort c. Lines are local
polynomials.
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Figure 2·7: The Field of Specialization of Doctors
(a) A. Gynaecology (b) B. Paediatrics
(c) A. Cardiology (d) B. General Surgery
(e) A. Internists (f) B. Anaesthesia
The female proportion and overall proportion of specialists, PMDC
Registration Database. For visualization purposes the lines are
smoothed curves.
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Figure 2·8: Increase in Doctors in Urban and Rural Districts
(a) Male Doctors (b) Female Doctors
Figure 2·10: The Spatial Distribution of Doctors
(a) A. MBBS (b) B. Specialize
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Figure 2·11: The Career Tenure Doctors
(a) MBBS (b) Specialized
The graph shows the overall tenure of medical graduates by birth cohort
and highest qualification based on registration data from the Pakistan
Medical and Dental Council website, 1960-1990. Plotted points corre-
spond to the likelihood of having an active license after 5 years, after
10 years and after 15 years. For visualization purposed the lines are
local polynomials.
Figure 2·12: Career Tenure by Gender
(a) Men (MBBS) (b) Women (MBBS)
The graph shows the overall tenure of medical graduates by birth co-
hort and gender for MBBS graduates, based on registration data from
the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council website, 1960-1990. Plotted
points correspond to the likelihood of having an active license after 5
years, after 10 years and after 15 years.
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Chapter 3
Can Male Dominated Industries Bring
Jobs for Women? Evidence from
Indonesia
3.1 Introduction
Women’s decision to work is significantly impacted by occupational characteristics
(Goldin, 2014; Wasserman, 2017). In turn, access to employment is considered one
of the top five factors that affect gender equality (World Bank, 2012). Structural
features such as work flexibility and skill type can cause certain occupations and
industries to become male or female dominated, and affect gender specific labor force
participation.
This paper studies the effects of the expansion of a male dominated industry on
women’s employment and where they work in a developing country context. In other
words, it examines how the growth of male biased jobs can account for variation
in female labor force participation across regions. Job and industry mixes in an
area typically vary over time and space, as different industries expand, contract and
concentrate locally (Mubarak, 2016; Jensen, 2012; Marchand, 2011). This occurs
partly in response to exogenous factors such as the presence of natural capital.
Mining industry expansions at a local level (alternatively, in a local economy)
are natural experiments that exemplify a change in the local industry mix. Local
economies can experience a change in occupational structure if they move from largely
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one source of employment, such as agriculture or services, to another source, such
as mining. Two factors render the mining industry particularly well-suited for this
question. First, mine expansions depend largely on the availability and value of
the natural resource being mined. Variation in expansions depend on the size of
resources available, how difficult they are to obtain, and their value in the global
market. Second, mines almost exclusively employ men, and are an example of a male
dominated industry where brawn is a valued quality in labor. In 2019, 93.7% of mine
employees were men and 6.7% women (Coaltrans Blog, 2019).
In this paper I focus on shocks to the mining industry in Indonesia, a country
particularly rich in minerals and mining. The industry contributed 8% to Indonesia’s
GDP in 2018, and since the 1970s mineral mining has also supported development
projects, including a famous primary school expansion (Duflo, 2001). The importance
of mining has also grown in the 2000s as a result of increased demand in international
markets. Apart from being rich in minerals, Indonesia also has the advantage of rich
data sources, including village level cross section survey data as well as individual
longitudinal data spanning more than two decades.
I explore the effects of changes in the mining industry by assembling data from
three main sources. First, accurate and complete data on mines is often unavailable
and difficult to collect. The SNL Metals and Mining dataset purchased from S&P
Global is one of the most reliable data sets used to study minerals and mines across
disciplines (Haas et al., 2019; Murguia et al., 2016). Among other features, the data
provide information on mine locations, activity and size for mines across Indonesia. I
match these with Indonesian labor force surveys (the Sakernas) (1999-2011) that are
useful for studying employment and industry sizes at the sub-district level (kecamatan,
the equivalent of a US county). Finally, to study the effects on individual women I
match the mining data with individual level panel data from the Indonesian Family
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Life Surveys (IFLS). The IFLS allows researchers to follow 50, 000 individuals over
the years 1993-2014, and use individual fixed effects to account for fixed individual
characteristics that could bias results.
Mining areas and non-mining areas are typically very different. Historically differ-
ent income and educational distributions are two examples of omitted variables that
could bias the comparison of outcomes between mining and non-mining districts. To
identify the effects of mine expansions I instrument for local mining value increases
using the world price of minerals interacted with the number of active mines at the
municipality level (Berman et al., 2017, Novosad et al., 2020). Local mining value
increases when the world price of a mineral rises, inducing existing mines to up pro-
duction and some stagnant mines to begin operating. Mining value will also be higher
in municipalities with more active mines than in those that face the same mineral
prices, but have fewer active mines. The strategy is viable given that world price
increases induce greater mine production, and are also plausibly exogenous to other
factors within Indonesia, since Indonesia’s market share does not dominate the global
market for minerals.
My results imply that while expansions in the mining industry lead to almost
negligible changes in employment, they cause higher wages for women. A one standard
deviation increase in world mineral prices results a 0.22% increase in womens’ monthly
wage, which is a meaningful result of the expansion of a male dominated industry.
Consistently with this, women are also less likely to work in unpaid jobs, which
indicates a move from informal to formal work for them.
Mining booms have substantial effects on where individuals work. Overall, the
agricultural sector becomes less important, and frees up labor that becomes employed
largely in the retail, wholesale, restauranting and trade sector (from hereon, retail).
Some individuals are absorbed in the mining sector as well, although this effect is
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surprisingly small, and may be because coal mines, which are the bulk of mines in
Indonesia, tend to not be as labor intensive as other types of mines. Women also
become employed in mining to small extent, and take on manufacturing or adminis-
trative roles within mining. They are also increasingly likely to be involved in public
administration. Therefore, the growth of mining, more than affecting equilibrium
wages and quantities, affected where individuals work. First, it released labor from
agriculture, and this labor was absorbed largely in the retail service sector. Second,
relative to the baseline, the growth of a male dominated industry led to slightly more
women being employed in that industry in manufacturing and administrative jobs
within.
A second important movement of labor that mining expansions affect is between
municipalities, which also subsequently affects the local demography. Using panel
data from the IFLS, I find that as a municipality’s mining value increases, individuals
living there are far more likely to have been born elsewhere than during lower mining
value times, and relative to municipalities where mining is less important. Lower and
middle level educated individuals are also more likely to have moved into mining mu-
nicipalities than higher educated individuals (who may have moved elsewhere). The
finding is reflected in the average educational level of mining municipalities decreas-
ing and becoming more concentrated in middle educated individuals as mining value
increases. The effect for women seems driven by innate characteristics, while men are
more likely to have moved from elsewhere conditional on time variant innate charac-
teristics. This suggests that men may be moving to opportunity, even conditioning on
individual characteristics, but the women who have move have innate characteristics
that play an important role in their decision to move.
A considerable literature devoted to the effects of natural resource discovery on
economic outcomes finds mixed results (Aragon and Rud, 2013; Allcott and Keniston,
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2018). More recently, its effects on female labor force participation have also been
studied (Ross, 2008; Kotsadam and Tolonen, 2016). To this end, most empirical work
has used repeated cross sections for analysis (Maurer and Potlogea, 2017; Kotsadam
and Tolonen, 2016), and I take this analysis further by exploiting time series variation,
as well as studying all major minerals in a single country. My results provide further
evidence of structural shifts found in previous research, with women typically moving
from agriculture to the service sector, and being more likely to work for pay. Addi-
tionally, women also are more likely to enter the male dominated mining industry as
well. The second main contribution is that depending on the type of mines, mining
may release more labor from agriculture than it can absorb, and this labor moves
to other sectors. In this context, instead of being employed in input manufacturing
sectors, for example, the labor becomes employed in the retail sector and promotes
local trade and consumption and is a positive local spillover of mining.
Recently the literature has also explored the effects of mining shocks intra-nationally
(Novosad and Asher, 2020), at which level labor is more mobile than at the interna-
tional level. I contribute by showing explicitly that, in addition to movement between
industries, mining expansions induce substantial movements between municipalities.
In fact, relatively open labor markets where labor can move relatively costlessly may
be a reason why equilibrium wages and quantities adjust and do not change signifi-
cantly.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide contextual
background and institutional details, followed by a discussion of my identification




Stagnant and low labor force participation among women have been a characteristic
of the Indonesian economy in the past few decades. In the sections below I provide
details on women’s employment in Indonesia and how it compares to other developing
countries. I also provide background on the mining industry and its importance.
Women’s Labor Force Participation in the Indonesian Context The di-
versity of populations in Indonesia (200 groups over 6000 inhabited islands) allows
researchers to study heterogenous populations living in a similar environment (CIA
2014). From the 1960s to the financial crisis of 1997, GDP/capita grew at an im-
pressive rate of 3.9 percent per year, and it has regained some of its momentum
since then. An increase in oil revenues in the 1970s led to massive expansion of ed-
ucational policies, for example through school building (Duflo (2001)). As a result,
primary and secondary education rates are relatively high compared to other devel-
oping countries. It is surprising thereore that in the period 1990-2010, overall female
labor force participation remained roughly stagnant.
Schaner and Das (2016) look at reasons this could be using Indonesian labor force
Sakernas and DHS data. Among other things, they find a U shaped relationship
between education and female labor force participation, although on controlling for
demographic characteristics the middle educated work as much as the least educated.
Household responsibilities are one big impediment to participating in the labor force
for married women, however, they note that there is selection into who has children
and how many. For example, certain types of women might be more likely to be
educated, to work, and want fewer children. One potential way to resolve the endo-
geneity would be to see if urban womens’ female labor force participation increases
when there are negative income shocks in rural areas, causing rural women to work
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in urban areas as house help. In a different setting, Aguero and Marks (2010) use in-
fertility as an instrument for the number of children that a woman can have, and use
Demographic and Health Surveys from 26 developing countries to show that children
don’t affect the likelihood of working, or the intensity, rather the type of work she
does.
Comola and de Mello (2009) also use Sakernas data for 1996-2004 and find that the
probability of being an employee in the formal sector and of being inactive increases
with education. For educated women, leaving the labor market altogether is preferred
to working in the informal sector. Females from households with high dependency
ratios are less likely to work, especially in the formal sector. The fact that women
are among the lowest paid (Cuevas et. al., (2009)), and the first to lose their job
when the minimum wage increases (in the manufacturing sector) (Del Caprio et. al.
(2015)) suggests that women often take undesirable jobs.
One reason that the middle educated might work less is that the jobs they get
have non-pecuniary disadvantages, such as inflexible timings or an attached stigma,
relative to the jobs of the least educated. In her influential 1970 book, Ester Boserup
writes that "the more flexible hours in home industries (relative to factory jobs) are a
great advantage for married women", and that in Indonesia, modern industries attract
women by offering part time work. Other researchers have pointed to a stigma in blue
collar jobs for married women in middle income countries (Goldin (1995)). A related
cultural factor could be stigma against not following gender roles. Husbands that let
wives work in unattractive jobs could be viewed by society as incompetent or lazy
because they can’t provide for the family (Goldin (1990)). Evidence for this story
could be some occupational segregation by education level, implying that there are
certain jobs that are available to middle educated women.
The other classical economics explanation is the income effect. Income and substi-
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tion effects determine how much individuals work on the extensive and the intensive
margins (Mincer (1962), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). Intuitively, we could observe
the female labor force participation patterns in Indonesia because the least educated
work because they need to, the income effect, and a high wage for the very educated
makes leisure expensive for them. The middle educated, however, have greater house-
hold income than the least educated, so they can afford leisure, but their wage is also
not high enough to induce them to work. Therefore the income effect makes them
opt out of the labor force, even if there is labor demand. In a simple OLS regression
of hours worked on household income (and other controls), the income effect is the
coefficient on household income. If this story is correct, I would expect this coeffi-
cient to be negative. In other words, if household income decreases, middle educated
women should increase their labor force participation.
The Mining Sector and its Performance Indonesia’s mining sector is large and
productive, and has contributed substantially to its GDP growth. In 2018, mining
and quarrying contributed 8% to Indonesia’s GDP (Hirschmann, R, Statista 2019).
Historically, the sector has significantly contributed to growth projects, such as the
well-known primary school expansion of the 1970s (Duflo, 2001). Global mining
companies continue to rank Indonesia highly in terms of mineral prospects1. Mine lo-
cations across Indonesia are mapped in figure 3·1. Active mines that are in production
exist on almost every major island, with a special concentration in East Kalimantan
and Sulawesi.
The most important minerals in terms of production are coal, gold, copper, tin,
bauxite and nickel. Of these, coal and gold are the most important, with 287 and 127
mines countrywide respectively. Coal in particular has experienced a large growth in
production between 2000 and 2012 (figure 3·2), partly due to a growth in demand
1. Mining in Indonesia, Investment and Taxation Guide, June 2019.
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for coal fired power plants in India and China (Mining in Indonesia, Investment and
Taxation Guide, 2013). Indonesian coal comprises of 9% of coal exports globally, and
95% of coal exports from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
The country’s repository of coal equals that of the United States2. Large mining
companies such as Vale, Newmont and Freeport and McMoRan are entrenched in
production and have multiple projects and subsidiaries.
Diverse mineral production across geographic regions provides natural variation
in production booms and busts in the mining sector across Indonesia. For example,
while the mining sector performed badly in 2015 overall due to a contraction of coal
production in response to declining prices, the Sulawesi region experienced a healthy
growth in the mining sector and contribution to GDP. Analysts attribute this growth
to investment for nickel smelters in the region, despite a ban of exporting raw nickel
(The Jakarta Post, 2016).
3.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the main data sources and identification strategy.
3.3.1 Data
Mining and price data The SNL Metals and Mining Data published by S&P
Global are the primary source of mining data in this paper. These contain information
on 560 Indonesian mines, of which 77 were active and operating between 1990-2011,
and 483 inactive), and 93 were active between 1990-2014, and 467 inactive mines.
This corresponds to 17 unique active and 138 unique inactive kecamatan in 2011,
and 19 active and 136 inactive kecamatan in 2014. Inactive mines are generally those
where production has not started, and are in one of various pre-production stages
at the time of the study. For example, 104 mines were in exploration stage, and 68
2. SES Professionals, Overview of Indonesia’s Mining Industry
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in the grassroots stage and another 51 in the target outline stage in 2018 (and so
were in pre-production in 2011 as well, though not at the same stage). Geographic
location of mines, mine production start year, mine capacity, world price of minerals
each year. Price data are from the World Bank commodity price data base.
Labor market data The Indonesian labor force surveys cover 27 unique kabputen3
with mines active in sample. I use repeated cross sections of the Sakernas from 1998
to 2011. Since the outcomes of interest involve working, I restrict the sample to the
working age indviduals who are between 22 and 60 years old to allow them to have
completed their education and not be out of the labor force on that account. Table 3.1
provides sample summary statistics for the sample. Half the sample is women, and
80% is married. In this rural (60%) and urban poplation (40%), 90% of individuals
have either a primary degree or secondary degree, which is consistent with schooling
upto the end of high school being compulsory4. About 70% of the sample engaged
in market work, which is an indicator for whether the individual worked last week,
had a job and temporarily did not work, or operated a business. Most individuals
worked last week, very few are in school by the age of 22, and half also did housework.
Finally, on average individuals work full time jobs 5 days a week, and earn about 75
USD monthly by 2020 conversion rates (conditional on working). Individuals within
one standard deviation of the mean earn between 25 USD and 125 USD, which is a
wide spread.
Individual Panel data I complement labor force survey data with survey data
from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). These data contain information on the
movements across municipalities and provinces of individuals, which is unavailable in
the labor force surveys. Further, their panel structure allow accounting for time fixed
3. alternatively, districts
4. Primary and middle school are free, high school attendance is at a small fee.
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individual characteristics that could bias the results. The panel data matched with
mining data covers 252 kabputen, of which 23 kabputen have active mines between
1993 and 2014, and 63 have either active or inactive mines.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for individuals aged 22-60 in the sample.
About half the sample is male and four fifths is married. The average respondent has 9
years of education, which corresponds to completing junior secondary school. Three
quarters of the sample worked, including working at least an hour in the previous
week, having a job and temporarily not working, or operating a family business. A
third of the sample lives in a municipality different from their birth municipality when
they are surveyed. Finally, the mean income conditional on working is about 300 USD
monthly, which is the income of a lower middle class individual in Indonesia today5.
While the IFLS is a smaller data set, it includes information on migration which
I use to examine mobility between districts. Further, the IFLS follows individuals
over times, and using individual fixed effects allows me to control for time invariant
individual factors that could bias results. The Sakernas, on the other hand, is larger
survey more representative of the Indonesian population that spans every year, and
can be used to examine year to year changes in average district outcomes.
3.3.2 Identification Strategy
One approach to identify the effects of the size of the mining industry growth would
compare outcomes in districts with new mines to those without. The concern with
this approach is that districts with and without mines are different on many levels,
and it may be difficult to explain outcome variation in terms of the mining industry
alone.
A second approach would be to restrict the study sample to only districts that have
at least one active mine over the study period (1998-2011), and consider the number
5. https://www.afr.com/world/asia/consumption-king-for-indonesia-s-new-middle-class-20190411-p51d3b
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of active mines as treatment. Fixed effects for year and district could account for
time invariant factors that influence the number of active mines and the likelihood a
woman works, such as the overall structure of the economy in a given district or year,
or historic factors specific to a district.
Probability(Workijt) = β0 + β1Mkjt
+βt + βj +Xijtβ + uijt
(3.1)
The probability of working equals 1 if individual i in kabputen j and observed in
year t reported working in the prior week, as opposed to attending school, doing house
keeping, and other activities besides personal activities. The independent variable of
interest is Mkjt, which is alternatively an indicator for district j having an active mine
in year t, or the discrete number of active mines in district j and year t. The sample
includes districts with active mines, no mines, with inactive mines that turn on in
the sample, with inactive mines that do not turn on in the sample. The regression
also includes year and district fixed effects, as well as individual characteristics such
as age, age2, indicators for education level and being married in Xijt.
To account for this endogeneity, I augment the previous strategy using an exoge-
nous source of variation in mine expansions and contractions. This captures the part
of mine value changes that are caused by plausibly exogenous factors, and mitigates
the role of omitted variables bias. In practice, I use the world price of minerals to
calculate changes to the total mining value of a district. The total mining value in-
teracts the world price of mineral k with the number of active mines that produce
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that mineral k in kabputen j, both in year t.
Probability(Workijt) = β0 + β1Mkjt ∗ log(Price)kt + β2Mkjt
+β3log(Price)kt + βt + βj +Xijtβ + uijt
(3.2)
In the specification above, log(Price)kt is the world price of mineral k in yeart.
This is coded as 0 for non-mine districts, and positive for a district with active or
inactive mines. Unless specified otherwise, Mkjt is the number of active mines of the
most important mineral (the mineral with the highest in district production over the
entire sample period). When it represents the number of mines, Mkjt ranges from
0-14 and equals 0 if there are no active mines of the main mineral in the district that
year, or if there are no mines at all in the district that year. There are 10 minerals in
the data set overall, and the most important district minerals tend to be coal, gold,
iron or nickel.
Mining value is denominated in US dollars, and the number of active mines in-
cludes mines that opened before 1998 (when data on the outcomes begins). This is the
total mining value (alternatively yield) and is different from the discretely measured
number of active mines. As before, αt are year fixed effects, αj are kabputen fixed
effects, and the covariate matrix Xijt includes individual demographic characteristics.
The error term uijt includes unobserved factors that affect the individual’s outcomes.
In this reduced form, β1 captures outcomes in districts where mining value is
moved by the world price, to those where the mining value doesn’t change. The own
effects of price changes are captured by β3, which identifies the effect of price changes
in districts with mines those with no mines. Including inactive mines allows for the
possibility that temporarily closed mines may become active when the world price is
favorable. Meanwhile, the effect of an additional active mine is captured by β1, which
is identified off of mine openings in the absence of price changes.
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Districts that produce the same minerals are likely to experience booms and busts
simultaneously, while those that specialize in another mine will remain relatively un-
affected. But districts can also produce more than one type of mineral, and experience
a boom for one and a bust for another. Therefore, in the main specification I use
active mines and mine prices of the most important mineral in the district (in terms
of production value), in a spirit similar to Berman et al. (2017). Alternatively, I can
use all district minerals and create a weighted sum of district mining value using each
mineral’s relative importance.
The main identifying assumptions of my strategy are the assumptions of instru-
mental variable and differences in differences strategies. First, there are parallel trends
in labor force participation across districts that experience booms and those that do
not. Second, that the world price of every mineral is exogenously determined, and not
affected by production in Indonesia. Further, it affects the likelihood of working only
through its effect on mineral value (exogeneity). Finally, the world price is correlated
with the mining value (instrument relevance).
The world price of minerals would be affected by Indonesian production if Indone-
sia produces a significant share of a mineral and therefore holds market power. This
is a concern especially for coal and gold of which Indonesia is among the top ten
producers in the world. To test how much Indonesia affects the price of minerals, I
can regress how the price of coal changes after a shock in the coal production sector
(for example, a mining sector law, or changes in export tariffs). In other words, how
do major events in Indonesia affect the world price of minerals in the current or next
period? A statistically non-significant result would suggest that the world price is
affected by global factors beyond Indonesia.
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3.4 Results
This section describes how local mining industry expansions affect on labor force
participation, monthly wages, and formal work. For each outcome, I first discuss
results from the Sakernas, followed by results from the IFLS.
3.4.1 Labor Force Participation
Table 3.3 presents the main labor force participation results.
In table 3.3, the outcome across specifications is an indicator that equals 1 if an
individual engaged in any work or prepared a business in the previous week, if they had
a job but temporarily did not work, and is 0 otherwise. The estimation corresponds to
equation 3.2. Columns 1-3 report estimates for men and women without individual
level controls. District (kabputen) fixed effects account for time-invariant district
characteristics that co-determine mining value and the likelihood of working, such
as municipality geography, climate and mining history. Meanwhile, year fixed effects
control for features of particular time periods that affect mining value and working,
such as the financial crisis of 1997.
In columns 4-6, covariates for age, marital status and education are included. Each
of these could be considered outcomes as well, since the demographic composition of
a district could change as the mining industry expands. Including these covariates in
the results serves two purposes. First, if selection effects are not very large relative
to the mean, the controls would account for individual characterisitics that are pre-
determined and differ between mining and non-mining kabputen. And second, they
could shed light on the type of sorting that occurs during mining booms.
Each of the coefficients in the first three columns are positive, statistically insignif-
icant, and close to zero, suggesting that there is no strong average effect of mining
value increases on the outcome. Including individual controls does not affect the co-
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efficients much, and they remain positive, small and insignificant. Either individual
covariates are not substantial pre-determined confounders, or their role is blurred by
selection effects induced by mining expansions.
The own effect of the number of active mines in a district (row 2) is negative
across columns. These coefficients are estimated for a mineral price of 1 USD per
unit, which is far out of sample in that it is an unrealistic world price. In table A.1 in
the Appendix I use a simple OLS regression to estimate how the likelihood of working
is affected by the number or active mines and world price of the main mineral. The
estimations include individual covariates, but do not include the number of mines and
price interaction term. Having at least one active mine in a municipality increases
the likelihood of working on average, conditional on education. The effects in the
remaining columns, such as of having a greater number of active mines in column 2,
or price increases for the most important mineral in column 4, are positive but saller
and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the extensive margin of having an
active mine itself is important for labor force participation conditional on all controls.
The changes induced by world prices are either very small, or result in offsetting forces
that lead to small coefficients in table 3.3.
Finally, in table 3.4 I use panel data from the IFLS to estimate the effect on labor
force participation for the same individual after mining value increases. The benefit of
including individual fixed effects is that unlike in the population, these are more likely
to be fixed and pre-determined in an individual. Most individuals have completed
their educational decisions by the age of 22, the youngest age in my sample. Further,
innate characteristics that affect the likelihood of working can be controlled for, and
increase the precision of estimates. Table 3.4 estimates reinforce the idea that there
is a small, positive effect on labor force participation. In some specifications it is
marginally statistically significant for men, but the size is about 2% of the mean of
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men’s overall likelihood of working. The same individual is not significantly more
likely to be working in columns 3-6.
3.4.2 Log(Monthly Wage)
Mining booms can affect labor markets through equilibrium wages (Maurer and Pot-
logea, 2017). For example, women’s wages can decrease if demand for their labor
decreases and their supply does not change as much.
In table 3.5, I estimate the effect of mining booms on monthly wage for working
individuals using equation 3.2.
The top and bottom 2% of monthly income are winsorized, and converted to loga-
rithm values. Monthly income corresponds to the Sakernas question on the previous
month’s income, which I supplement with a normal month’s income if the first is
missing. Finally, in the time period studied (1998-2011), the Sakernas collected wage
information for employed workers (Smith et al., 2000), and self-employed individuals
were not included.
The first three columns of table 3.5, reveal an interaction effect that is positive
but statistically insignificant for overall and for men. Women, however, experience
a small but statistically significant increase in monthly wages. A 1% increase in
world mineral prices results in a 0.08% increase in their monthly wage; a 1 standard
deviation increase in world price results in an increase of 0.22%. While small, the
increase is meaningful because it results from an expansion of a highly male dominated
industry, implying that women can benefit even as industries that do not typically
employ them grow.
As with labor force participation, individual controls in columns 3-6 do not im-
pact coefficients strongly. Women have a significant increase in wages even when
accounting for their education, age and marital status.
Table 3.6 utilizes IFLS panel data, which includes business incomes of self em-
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ployed individuals as well as salaries of employed individuals. Average wages are not
substantially affected, although there is an indication that once business incomes are
included, average wages decrease slightly. This result is larger for women and driven
primarily by women owned businesses that employ 1 or more temporary workers.
While there could be many reasons for why these business profits decline, one could
be the adverse effects of increased competition from retail and trade growth in the
district.
In the mechanism section below, I explore ways in which labor supply could be
changing, and selection, in response to mining booms.
3.4.3 Formal Work
Formal work is reflective of job security because it typically involves official contracts.
Although equilibrium labor force participation and wages did not change much, if
the place of work changed for individuals the job security they experience could be
affected.
The Sakernas surveys categorize formal and informal work in the following cat-
egories: self-employed, self-employed and assisted by a temporary unpaid workers,
self-employed and assisted by permanent workers, employee or paid worker, and un-
paid worker. In the analysis below, I treat being an unpaid worker as being informally
employed, being a paid worker as being formally employed, and combine self employed
categories to one distinct category. Table 3.7 examines the effects of mining booms
on the likelihood of being self-employed, working as a paid employee, and being an
unpaid worker, with separate estimates for men and women in the bottom two panels.
Although there are no substantial effects on average, the main important result is
in the bottom panel for women. There is a slight decrease in the likelihood that women
do unpaid work (table 3.7). Conditioning on individual controls decreases these effects
slightly but not completely. To some extent changes in education, for example, can
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explain the decrease in women’s unpaid work. But mining booms can also affect this
outcome by changing the job mix available. As I explore in the next section, women
and men are less likely to work in agriculture, where women especially can be unpaid
workers. Instead, they move to working in the service sector, and especially in retail.
This could also partly explain the decrease in unpaid work. Although the coefficients
on self employment and paid employment are small and statisticaly insignificant, they
are positive for women, suggesting women could be moving to jobs that have formal
contracts or to self employment.
3.5 Mechanisms
3.5.1 Industry of Work
Mining industry expansions can induce movements of labor between industries, which
is relevant to the overall effects on labor force participation. Individuals moving
between industries implies a structural change in where individuals work, and would
also substantiate the lack of changes in average labor force participation and wages.
Table 3.8 details the likelihood of working in six different industries. The industries
shown represent large industries such as agriculture, manufacturing and services, and
mining, which is directly relevant. The top panel presents results from estimating
equation 3.2 for all Indonesian districts, and the bottom panel restricts estimation
to districts with active or inactive mines ("mining districts"). In each column, the
outcome is an indicator for working in a specific industry.
In mining districts there a 100% increase in world price causes a a 0.14 percentage
point increase in working in mining, a 0.91 percentage point decrease in working in
agriculture, and 0.31 percentage point increase in retail (which includes wholesale,
restauranting and trading).
The most surprising takeaway is that mining booms do not result in a substantial
117
increase in mining employment. An increase of 0.14 percentage points is about 10
percent of the size of the mining industry, which is already quite small relative to
others such as agriculture. One reason for labor in mining to not increase by very
much is that the bulk of mines in Indonesia are coal mines, which tend to be less
labor and more capital intensive than other mines (such as gold mines)6.
A substantial decrease in agriculture, and a complementary increase in retail are
other consequences of mine expansions. This may be due to greater district growth,
which creates demand for retail and trade, and pulls labor from agriculture to the
service sector. The retail stores can be owned by companies, be private, or govern-
ment owned. Meanwhile, there is no significant change in manufacturing, and in the
education and health sectors. Sectors that have increased employment are not neces-
sarily those that produce manufactured inputs for mining, but those associated with
general municipality urbanization, trade and consumption.
Finally, in table in the Appendix I separate effects for men and women. Both men
and women experience decreases in the likelihood of working in agriculture. Men are
more likely to work in retail, whereas women work more in public administration
(which includes auditors, purchasing agents and general operations managers), and
in mining. Within mining, women’s occupations are in manufacturing, health care,
administration, and "miscellaneous production and labor subsectors".
I also provide wage changes for the sectors of mining, agriculture and retail in
the Appendix table A.4. Wage changes in each sector are consistent with growth and
decline in sectoral employment. Wages are positive in mining and retail, and negative
in agriculture, though none are statistically significant.




An important open question in the economics of natural resources is how these expan-
sions cause movements of labor between open labor markets. Where the size of the
mining industry experiences a shock and relatively low restrictions to labor mobility
prevail, migration is likely to play a role in equilibrium changes. However, few papers
have directly addressed this at the sub-national level, where migration is likely to
play a greater role since movement is easier sub-nationally than internationally.
In this section I use IFLS data to explore how mining booms affect migration
between districts.
Table 3.9 examines if individuals are more or less likely to leave origin mining
districts that experience mine booms. As before for the IFLS results, columns 1-3
include district and year fixed effects, while columns 4-6 include district, year and
individual fixed effects. Individuals in origin mining districts are less likely to move
away during mine booms on average. A 100% price increases causes an almost 2
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of leaving mining districts, relative to
non-boom years and to lower mining value mining districts (column 1). This is a
decrease of 40% relative to the mean, and is a substantial effect for origin districts.
The coefficients for women are more negative and significant than for men. Women
who may have otherwise left mining districts are more likely to stay on during boom
times, perhaps because they are more likely to find better quality employment than
otherwise.
Where do individuals move if they move? In table 3.10 I present results from
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estimating a gravity equation of the following form:
Probability(Migrateodt) = β0 + β1Mokt ∗ log(Price)t + β2Mokt + β3log(Price)kt
+β1Mjlt ∗ log(Price)lt + β2Mjlt + β3log(Price)lt
+βt + βod + uodt
(3.3)
where o is an origin district with most important mineral k, and d is a destination
district with most important mineral i. Own effects and interactions are included for
both origin and district districts, as well as year fixed effects and origin-district pair
fixed effects. Finally, the equation is estimated at the district instead of the individual
level, because expanding the data set to origin destination pairs for every individual
was computationally infeasible.
The results in table 3.10, though small in size, suggest that individuals tend to
move to districts experiencing mining booms. Mining booms in origin mining districts
cause individuals to be less likely to leave (columns 2 and 4), as in the previous table.
Booms in the destination mining district cause movement to these districts.
Odd numbered columns focus on destination districts that are mining districts
only (and any origin district). Even numbered columns focus on movements between
origin and destination districts that both are mining districts. The similarity in
the size of coefficients between the two columns suggests that movement to mining
destination districts are largely from origin mining districts. Perhaps the type of
employment and living in mining destination districts is attractive to those who have
already lived in mining districts.
In table 3.10, the coefficients are larger and more significant for men moving to
destination districts with mining booms. Together, the results imply that mining
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booms lead women to be less likely to leave origin mining districts, and men more
likely to move to destination mining districts.
In the Appendix I use population weights provided in the Sakernas labor force
data to estimate population size changes after mining booms. While there is an
increase in population overall, the results are noisy and not statistically significant.
This could be because opportunities in mining towns attract some individuals, but
other features or town amenities make it unattractive for other types of people.
Overall, booms in origin mining districts lead individuals, and especially women,
to be less likely to leave. Conditional on moving, individuals move to mining districts
experiencing booms. Changes in migration suggest that labor mobility between dis-
tricts is feasible, and districts are examples of relatively open economies. Further,
movement between districts affects individuals’ supply response to labor demand
changes in mining districts.
3.5.3 Education
The educational distribution may change if individuals face changing opportunity
costs of attending school, or if the composition of individuals changes due to migra-
tion. The youngest individual in my sample is 22, at which age most individuals have
completed education up to the college level, limiting the importance of this channel.
All variables in the data are measured at the year to year level. For example, a price
increase implies an average higher yearly price. A year may be sufficient time for
some population movements from neighboring districts. Further, price increases over
sustained periods of time allow for even greater movement.
In table 3.11 I examine the effect of mining booms on the educational composition
of municipalities. The outcome in each column is the probability of having completed
or completing an educational level. Overall, mining expansions result in a shift toward
individuals with a lower educational degree. In the top panel, a 100% increase in price
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leads to a 0.67 pp increase in the the probability of having a primary degree, and a
0.22 percentage point decrease in having a post secondary degree across all kabputen.
In the lower panel’s sample of only kabputen with inactive or active mines, the effects
are slightly larger.
Table 3.13 provides additional evidence for this result using IFLS data, where
the outcome is defined as the years of education completed. The mean of 8.7 years
of education corresponds roughly to having completed lower secondary school. In
columns 1-3, there is a substantial decrease in the years of education caused by mining
expansions. Overall, a 10% price increase results in a 2.9 percentage point decrease
in the years of education, moving the mean from 8.7 to 5.8 years of education if the
former was a baseline group mean. This is a substantial decrease, and is perhaps
greater than in table 3.13 because the outcome is measured at a more disaggregated
level (years of education), instead of broader educational levels. In columns 4-6 I
include individual fixed effects as well as district fixed effects. The education level
of the same individual does not significantly change as a result of mining booms,
suggesting again that the average effects are driven by a change in the district’s
population.
Decomposing the results for men and women in Appendix table reveals that the
educational distribution changes in similar ways for both groups, but the magnitudes
and statistical significance is stronger for men.
The educational distribution changing as a result of mining expansions implies,
first, that education is itself an outcome variable in this case, and to some extent would
function as a bad control. Second, mining expansions lead to negative selection in
education, as individuals with lower levels of schooling sort into mining towns. These
demographic changes are key to interpreting the overall results. They imply that while
the average level of employment does not change, mining booms cause substantial
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movements in mining districts, as well as changes to their economic structure.
3.6 Conclusion
In this project I study the effects of an expansion in a male dominated industry on
women’s labor force participation and where they work. The industry I focus on
is the mining industry in Indonesia, which is a primarily male dominated industry.
Moreover, the Indonesian context provides rich variation in the nature of the mining
industry, and in data that can be used to study its effects.
A growth in the mining sector could potentially crowd out jobs that typically
employ women. Further, a household income effect of increased male earnings would
also reduce female employment. Alternatively, expansion of the mining sector could
lead to economic growth and create jobs for women in complementary sectors.
To study these effects I use high quality proprietary data on mine locations and
value, and compare localities that experienced mine expansions to those that did not.
I instrument for mining booms with fluctuations in the world price of minerals.
I show that expansions in the mining industry lead to a small increase in em-
ployment for women, mostly through an accompanying growth in the services sector.
Overall, the agricultural sector becomes less important in the local economy, and the
share of employment in the service and mining sectors rises. Women become em-
ployed in health and education services, with more educated women entering finance.
Together, these results highlight how a male biased labor demand shock can positively
affect women’s employment, and result in a structural shift in where they work.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Sample Summary Statistics - Sakernas
Mean Standard Deviation Obs. Min Max
Pr(Male) 0.50 0.50 3770286 0 1
Age 38.17 10.48 3770286 22 60
Pr(Married) 0.81 0.39 3770286 0 1
Pr(Primary) 0.40 0.49 3016306 0 1
Pr(Secondary) 0.51 0.50 3016306 0 1
Pr(Associates) 0.02 0.50 3016306 0 1
Pr(Post Secondary) 0.07 0.23 3016306 0 1
Pr(Urban) 0.41 0.49 3770286 0 1
Pr(Work) 0.73 0.44 3770286 0 1
Pr(Worked Last Week) 0.71 0.45 3770286 0 1
Pr(In School Last Week) 0.01 0.11 3770286 0 1
Pr(Housekeeping Last Week) 0.55 0.50 3770286 0 1
Pr(Other Last Week) 0.54 0.50 3770286 0 1
Number Days Worked 5.79 1.55 2760579 0 7
Number Hours Worked 40.10 17.70 2760579 0 98
Income (2010 IDR) 1098818 820236 1411569 4 11963342
Note: The table presents summary statistics of means, standard deviations, range and the number of
observations for dependent and independent variables used in the paper and appendix. The sample is of
individuals aged 16-65, and data are from repeated cross sections of the Indonesian labor force surveys
(Sakernas), 1998-2011.
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Table 3.2: Sample Summary Statistics - IFLS
Mean Standard Deviation Obs. Min Max
Pr(Male) 0.47 0.50 92834 0 1
Age 37.55 10.58 92834 22 60
Pr(Married) 0.82 0.39 92834 0 1
Education Years Attained 8.55 4.50 66667 0 22
Pr(Urban) 0.54 0.50 92830 0 1
Pr(Work) 0.74 0.44 92834 0 1
Hours Worked Normally 42.71 21.60 67796 0 168
Income (2010 IDR) 4160447 1.33e+08 59793 0 6.37e+09
Pr(Born in Another Municipality) 0.32 0.47 43057 0 1
Note: The table presents summary statistics of means, standard deviations, range and the number of
observations for dependent and independent variables used in the paper and in the appendix. The sample
is of individuals aged 22-60, and data are from the individual level panel data from the Indonesian Family
Life Surveys (IFLS), 1993-2014.
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Mining Activity on Labor Force Participation - Sakernas
Probability(Work)
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0021 0.0005 0.0039 0.0020 0.0004 0.0036
(0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0036)
Active mine (main mineral) -0.0142 -0.0032 -0.0263 -0.0142 -0.0031 -0.0247
(0.0097) (0.0037) (0.0188) (0.0102) (0.0037) (0.0194)
ln price (main mineral) -0.0057 -0.0013 -0.0102 -0.0043 0.0014 -0.0111
(0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0090) (0.0048) (0.0021) (0.0086)
Observations 3756226 1864864 1891362 3756226 1864864 1891362
R2 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.11
F 21.1 25.9 20.1 286.3 213.3 373.4
Mean DV 0.65 0.81 0.48 0.65 0.81 0.48
Controls N N N Y Y Y
All Males Females All Males Females
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Probability(Work)= 1 if an individual reported working last week, temporarily did not work but has a job, or
started a business last week. All regressions include year and kabputen FE. Columns 4-6 include controls for
age, age2, indicators for education level and being married. The data sample extends from 1998-2011, with
316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with active mines at some point in the sample and 71 with active
or inactive mines.
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Table 3.4: The Effect of Mining Activity on Labor Force Participation - IFLS
Probability(Work)
All Males Females All Males Females
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0102 0.0207∗ 0.0035 0.0080 0.0124 0.0046
(0.0086) (0.0109) (0.0183) (0.0138) (0.0156) (0.0217)
Observations 92348 43796 48552 92348 43796 48552
R2 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.63 0.56 0.60
F 88.8 88.0 46.8 . . .
Mean DV 0.74 0.89 0.59 0.74 0.89 0.59
District FE Y Y Y N N N
Individual FE N N N Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Probability(Work)= 1 if an individual reported working last week, has a job but temporarily did not
work, or runs a business. All regressions include year fixed effects. Columns 1-3 include kabputen FE,
columns 4-6 replace these with individual fixed effects. The IFLS sample extends from 1993-2014, with
252 kabputen, 23 kabputen with active mines, and 63 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Mining Activity on Monthly Wage - Sakernas
Log(Monthly Wage)
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0425 0.0032 0.0750∗∗ 0.0386∗ -0.0059 0.0690∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0239) (0.0324) (0.0222) (0.0257) (0.0273)
Num. active mines -0.2605∗ -0.0248 -0.3851∗∗ -0.2494∗∗ 0.0125 -0.3645∗∗
(0.1386) (0.1142) (0.1739) (0.1115) (0.1225) (0.1446)
log price 0.0675 0.0736 0.0027 0.1140∗ 0.1230∗∗∗ -0.0013
(0.0688) (0.0489) (0.0904) (0.0672) (0.0465) (0.0784)
Observations 2317660 1108578 1209082 2317660 1108578 1209082
R2 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.17
F 394.0 133.7 356.3 777.1 358.7 939.9
Mean DV 13.43 13.54 13.18 13.43 13.54 13.18
Mean DV (IDR) 924,000 987,000 787,000 924,000 987,000 787,000
Controls N N N Y Y Y
All Males Females All Males Females
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Log(Monthly Income) is the logarithm of last month’s net income. All regressions include year and district
FE. Standard errors clustered at the district level. Columns 4-6 include controls for age, age2, indicators for
education level and being married. The data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million
observations), 26 with active mines at some point in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Mining Activity on Monthly Wage - IFLS
Log(Monthly Wage)
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.0901 -0.0806 -0.1175 -0.0408 -0.0124 -0.1137
(0.0603) (0.0540) (0.0912) (0.0712) (0.0675) (0.1020)
Observations 55244 34245 20982 55248 34250 20998
R2 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.85 0.83 0.88
F 1431.1 1290.2 822.2 650.5 651.7 273.3
Mean DV 12.9 13.2 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.2
Mean DV (IDR) 146,0000 172,0000 103,0000 146,0000 172,0000 103,0000
All Males Females All Males Females
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual FE N N N Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Monthly
income is expressed in IDR and includes net earnings from salaries and business incomes. All regressions
include year fixed effects. Columns 1-3 include kabputen FE, columns 4-6 further include individual fixed
effects. The IFLS sample extends from 1993-2014, with 252 kabputen, 23 kabputen with active mines, and
63 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.7: The Effect of Mining Activity on the Status of Work
Formal-Informal Status of Work
Self-Emp Emp Unpaid Self-Emp Emp Unpaid
All
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.0002 0.0025 -0.0023 0.0007 -0.0000 -0.0007
(0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0018)
Observations 2172614 2172614 2172614 2172614 2172614 2172614
R2 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.27 0.11
F 58.3 69.3 26.7 803.5 1139.9 162.1
Men
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.0013 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0017
(0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0015) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0013)
Observations 1410654 1410654 1410654 1410654 1410654 1410654
R2 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.22 0.11
F 55.6 62.4 36.6 389.3 704.4 89.3
Wonen
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0046 0.0058 -0.0104∗∗ 0.0052 0.0022 -0.0074∗
(0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0043) (0.0064) (0.0041) (0.0040)
Observations 761960 761960 761960 761960 761960 761960
R2 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.39 0.24
F 31.7 54.8 17.4 903.9 1292.0 158.0
Controls N N N Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
The outcome in each column is an indicator for a given status of work. All regressions include year and
kabputen FE. Columns 4-6 include controls for age, age2, indicators for education level and being married.
Data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with active mines at
some point in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Mining Activity on Industry of Work
Probability(Work)
Mining Agriculture Manufaturing Retail Public Education/
Admin. Health
All kabputen
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0013 -0.0092∗ 0.0009 0.0032∗∗ 0.0012 0.0010
(0.0013) (0.0052) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Observations 2728239 2728239 2728239 2728239 2728239 2728239
R2 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01
F 9.6 29.0 6.0 9.1 33.7 73.7
Mining kabputen
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0014∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0031∗∗ 0.0013 0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008)
Observations 782513 782513 782513 782513 782513 782513
R2 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
F 8.5 14.7 3.2 8.1 18.4 29.6
Mean DV 0.015 0.45 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcome
in each column is an indicator for working in a given industry. The first panel uses all kabputen, the second uses
variation within kabputen with active or inactive mines. All regressions include year and kabputen FE. The data
sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with active mines at some point in
the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.9: The Effect of Mining Expanions on Moving from an Origin Mining District
Probability(Migrate from Origin)
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.0171∗∗ -0.0077 -0.0268∗∗ -0.0124∗∗ -0.0070 -0.0204∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0104) (0.0058) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Observations 493996 246733 247263 493996 246733 247263
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.21 0.20
F 47.6 40.1 39.0 . . .
Mean DV 0.043 0.047 0.043 0.043 0.047 0.043
All Males Females All Males Females
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the origin district level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Pr(Migrated) equals 1 if the individual reports moving in that year, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include
year fixed effects. Columns 1-3 include kabputen FE, columns 4-6 also include individual fixed effects.
The regression sample includes only districts which have an active or inactive mine at some point between
1993-2014.
132
Table 3.10: The Effect of Mining Activity on Migration: Gravity Equation Estimation
Probability(Migrated)
Origin mines x log(price) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Destination mines x log(price) 0.0006∗∗ 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 2535360 2127014 2535360 2127014 2535360 2127014
R2 0.24 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19
F 5.3 5.3 5.4 6.8 4.2 .
Mean DV 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
All All Men Men Women Women
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the origin and destination district levels. * p<.10,
** p<.05, *** p<.01. Probability(Migrated) equals 1 if the individual reports moving in that year from
origin district X to destination district Y, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include year fixed effects and
origin-destination pair fixed effects. In column 1, destination districts are restricted to those with active
or inactive mines at any point in the sample, and in column 2 origins and destinations are both restricted
to mining districts. Both columns exclude origin districts that are the same as destination districts.
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Table 3.11: The Effect of Mining Activity on Educational Attainment - Sakernas I
Highest Education Level
<Primary Primary Junior High Senior High Diploma Post-Secondary
All kabputen
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0006 -0.0037 -0.0004 0.0025∗ 0.0009 0.0001
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Observations 3756226 3756226 3756226 3756226 3756226 3756226
R2 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.03
F 71.2 408.5 187.6 40.2 26.1 89.2
Mean DV 0.2 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.01 0.06
Mining kabputen
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0007 -0.0041 -0.0003 0.0027∗∗ 0.0010∗ -0.0001
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Observations 1054266 1054266 1054266 1054266 1054266 1054266
R2 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02
F 37.7 192.1 123.5 22.8 13.4 39.1
Mean DV 0.2 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcome in
each column is an indicator for having completed or completing a given level of education. All regressions include year and
kabputen FE. The first panel uses all kabputen, the second uses variation within kabputen with active or inactive mines.
The data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with active mines at some point
in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.12: The Effect of Mining Activity on Educational Attainment - Sakernas II
Highest Education Level
<Primary Primary Junior High Senior High Diploma Post-Secondary
All
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0006 -0.0037 -0.0004 0.0025∗ 0.0009 0.0001
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Observations 3756226 3756226 3756226 3756226 3756226 3756226
R2 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.03
F 71.2 408.5 187.6 40.2 26.1 89.2
Men
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0008 -0.0041 -0.0010 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0001
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Observations 1864864 1864864 1864864 1864864 1864864 1864864
R2 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.03
F 60.8 379.2 156.7 34.7 10.9 49.7
Women
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0004 -0.0032 0.0002 0.0014 0.0012 -0.0000
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0007)
Observations 1891362 1891362 1891362 1891362 1891362 1891362
R2 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.03
F 72.6 388.6 198.4 39.1 26.7 98.9
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcome in
each column is an indicator for having completed or completing a given level of education. All regressions include year and
kabputen FE. The first panel uses all kabputen, the second uses variation within kabputen with active or inactive mines.
The data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with active mines at some point
in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.13: The Effect of Mining Activity on Educational Attainment - IFLS I
Highest Education Level
<Primary Primary Junior High Senior High Diploma Post-Secondary
All
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0163 -0.0149∗ 0.0049 0.0019 -0.0007
(0.0091) (0.0111) (0.0080) (0.0125) (0.0033) (0.0078)
Observations 66289 66289 66289 66289 66289 66289
R2 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.07
F 92.8 21.3 5.7 70.8 46.8 51.7
Men
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0238∗ 0.0042 -0.0033 -0.0139 -0.0032 -0.0019
(0.0137) (0.0117) (0.0092) (0.0181) (0.0046) (0.0052)
Observations 32866 32866 32866 32866 32866 32866
R2 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.08
F 49.1 18.1 3.8 52.1 33.6 48.2
Women
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0413∗∗∗ -0.0315 -0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0188∗ 0.0059∗ 0.0033
(0.0092) (0.0199) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0035) (0.0113)
Observations 33423 33423 33423 33423 33423 33423
R2 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.07
F 108.1 18.8 7.5 56.4 41.5 51.4
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The outcome in
each column is an indicator for having completed or completing a given level of education. All regressions include year and
kabputen FE. The first panel uses all kabputen, the second uses variation within kabputen with active or inactive mines.
The data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with active mines at some point
in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table 3.14: The Effect of Mining Activity on Educational Attainment - IFLS II
Years of Education
All Males Females All Males Females
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.1860∗∗ -0.2629∗∗ -0.1408 -0.0135 0.0213 -0.0462
(0.0876) (0.1317) (0.1101) (0.0214) (0.0558) (0.0465)
Observations 66289 32866 33423 66289 32866 33423
R2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.97 0.97 0.97
F 341.9 209.2 315.2 10.6 9.4 6.6
Mean DV 8.7 8.9 8.4 8.7 8.9 8.4
District FE Y Y Y N N N
Individual FE N N N Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
The outcome is years of educational attainment. All regressions include year fixed effects. Columns 1-3
include kabputen FE, columns 4-6 replace these with individual fixed effects. The IFLS sample extends
from 1993-2014, with 252 kabputen, 23 kabputen with active mines, and 63 with active or inactive mines.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3·1: The Distribution of Mines Across Indonesian Districts
The figure shows a map of active and inactive mines across Indonesian. Points are
the latitude and longitude of mines, created using the SNL Metals and Mining data.
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Figure 3·2: Growth in Coal and mineral production in Indonesia
The graph shows trends in the production of major minerals Indonesia relative to
baseline production levels in 2000. Source: Mining in Indonesia (2013), Investment
and Taxation Guide, 5th edition.
















Log price over time
The graph shows growth over time in the world price of minerals.
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The graph shows the effect of the medical admissions policy change on
the share of female medical graduates. Data are from repeated cross
sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2012. Circles represent the
mean female share of medical graduates in a given birth year, lines
are local polynomial regressions fitted to the data, with 95% confience
intervals in gray. The medical school admissions policy change was
effective for individuals born in or after 1976, for whom the proportion
of women medical graduates is higher than for prior birth cohorts.
142
Table A.1: Crowd Out of Men in Medical School
Number Male Medical Graduates
Treated x No. Fem Med. Grads -0.5628∗∗∗
(0.1809)






Survey Year FE Y
Mean DV 840
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on crowd
out of men from medical school. The data are collapsed to the
educational x birth cohort x city level for each gender, and the
coefficients estimated with the equation No.MaleGradcj = α0 +
α1Treated ∗ No.FemGradcj + α2No.FemGradcj + αc + αj + ucj.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort
level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. "Treated" women are
those exposed to the policy change. Data are from repeated cross
sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010. The coefficients
on each of the own terms are included in the regression but not
reported here.
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Table A.2: Variation in Policy Effect by Distance
Probability(Medical Graduate)
Treated x Distance (1000 km) -0.0980∗∗
(0.0459)





Year FE Y Y
District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.036 0.036
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on the probability
of becoming a medical graduate estimated using equation 1.1. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. "Treated" women are those exposed to the policy
change. This variable is interacted with a measure of distance that is
measured in 1000s of kilometers, as the straight line distance between
the centroid of the district with the closest medical school and that of
the district of the woman’s residence. In column (1) this is a continuous
measure, and in column (2) a discrete measure for having a medical school
in the district of residence. Data are from repeated cross sections of the
Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, the sample is of women in cities, aged
20-47 and with at least a college degree. Column (1) presents estimates of
equation 3.1 for the probability of working for the full sample of women in
cities, aged 20-47 and with at least a college degree. Regressions include
controls for age and age2. The coefficients on each of the own terms are
included in the regression but not reported here.
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Synthetic Cohort − Medical Grads
(a) Panel A
Marriage probability of treated
and non-treated cohorts of med-
ical graduates observed at the
same age. Data are from the
Labor Force Surveys 1990-2010.



















Marriage probability of treated
and non-treated cohorts of other
college graduates observed at the
same age. Data are from the
Labor Force Surveys 1990-2010.
For visual purposes the curves
are moving averages.
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Table A.3: Jointly Determined Probability of Working and Marriage
Probability(Married) Probability(Work)
(1) (2)





District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Survey FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.59 0.22
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on the
marriage and labor force participation rates of medical graduates
estimated with a bivariate probit regression based on equation
3.1. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the birth
cohort level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. "Treated"
women are those exposed to the policy change. Data are from
repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010,
and the sample is of women in cities, aged 20-47 and with at
least a college degree. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator
for being married, and in column (2) an indicator for working.
The correlation coefficient ρ reports a negative association between
working and being married. Regressions include controls for age
and age2. The coefficients on each of the own terms are included
in the regression but not reported here.
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Table A.4: Spousal Educational Attainment
Probability of Marrying
Med. Engg. Other College Post Grad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated x Med. Grads -0.1222∗ -0.0045 0.0551 0.0869
(0.0616) (0.0528) (0.0435) (0.0531)
Med. Grads 0.4196∗∗∗ 0.0797∗∗∗ -0.2552∗∗∗ -0.0986∗∗∗
(0.0369) (0.0260) (0.0240) (0.0256)
Observations 5088 6852 6852 6852
R2 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.04
District FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.06 0.07 0.39 0.27
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on the spousal
attainment of married women using equation 3.1. Standard errors are
in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. "Treated" women are those exposed to the policy
change. Data are from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys,
1990-2010, and the sample of women in cities, aged 20-47 and with at least
a college degree. The outcome in column (1) is an indicator for marrying
a medical graduate, in column (2) an engineering graduate, in column (3)
marrying a spouse with another college degree, and in (4) for marrying a
post graduate. Regressions corresponding to males with less than college
degree and an agricultural degree are omitted from the table and available
on request. Regressions include controls for age and age2. The coefficients
on each of the own terms are included in the regression but not reported
here.
Table A.5: Spousal Educational Attainment
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Table A.6: Divorce Rate and Spousal Age Gap
Pr(Divorced) Spousal Age Gap
(1) (2)
Treated x Med. Grads -0.0006 -0.2297
(0.0009) (0.5540)




District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.002 6.03
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on
the divorce rate and age gap between spouses using equa-
tion 3.1. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at
the birth cohort level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
"Treated" women are those exposed to the policy change.
Data are from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force
Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sample of women in cities,
aged 20-47 and with at least a college degree. The out-
come in column (1) is the probability of being divorced,
and in column (2) difference in age between themselves
and their spouse (restricted to married women only). Re-
gressions include controls for age and age2. The coeffi-
cients on each of the own terms are included in the re-
gression but not reported here.
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Table A.7: Hours Worked Last Week
Number Hours Worked Last Week
(1)






Survey year FE Y
Note: The table presents estimates of the policy change on
hours worked last week, conditional on working. A Heck-
man selection correction procedure described in equations
1.5 and 1.6 is used to correct for selection into working.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the birth
cohort level. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. "Treated"
women are those exposed to the policy change. Data are
from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys,
1990-2010, and the sample of women in cities, aged 20-47
and with at least a college degree. Regressions include con-
trols for age and age2. The coefficients on each of the own











Survey year FE Y
Note: The table presents estimates of
the policy effect on the logarithm of
women’s real wages, estimated using a
Heckman selection correction procedure
as described in equations 1.5 and 1.6.
Standard errors are in parentheses, clus-
tered at the birth cohort level. ∗p <
0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. "Treated"
women are those exposed to the policy
change. Data are from repeated cross
sections of the Labor Force Surveys,
1990-2010, and the sample of women in
cities, aged 20-47 and with at least a col-
lege degree. Regressions include controls
for age and age2. The coefficients on
each of the own terms are included in
the regression but not reported here.
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Table A.9: Robustness Checks
Closer Cohorts Fully Treated Placebo Year
1960 1965 1970
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probability(Married)
Treated x Med. Grads -0.1333∗∗ -0.1963∗∗∗ 0.0240 -0.0060 0.0231
(0.0502) (0.0364) (0.0432) (0.0381) (0.0405)
N 7296 7437 4728 4728 4728
Probability(Work)
Treated x Med. Grads 0.0941∗ 0.0657 0.1848∗∗ -0.0007 0.0162
(0.0468) (0.0540) (0.0719) (0.0726) (0.0438)
N 7296 7437 4728 4728 4728
Log(Spousal Income)
Treated x Med. Grads 0.2883∗ 0.3337∗ 0.3575 0.3575 0.0490
(0.1627) (0.1578) (0.2360) (0.2360) (0.1366)
N 1874 2016 2054 2054 2054
District FE Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Note: The table reports results for the main outcomes using three types of robustness
checks corresponding to section 4.7. Cells contain coefficients from ineraction terms. In
column (1) I compare cohorts born between 1970-1985, born closer to each other around
the reform. In column (2) I remove individuals born between 1972-1975 that may have
been partially treated. Finally, in columns (3)-(5) I place the policy in 3 different placebo
years by expanding the sample to birth cohorts 1955-1986, and placing the policy in years
1960, 1965 and 1970. All regressions are estimated using equation 3.1. "Treated" women
are those exposed to the policy change. Data are from repeated cross sections of the
Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sample is of women in cities, aged 20-47, with
at least a college degree. All regressions control for age and age2. The coefficients on
each of the own terms are included in the regression but not reported here..
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Table A.10: Prior Probability of Working by Income Class and Mi-
grant Status










District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Survey FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.23 0.60
Note: The table reports the probability of working by
group pre-reform for college graduate women and med-
ical graduate women. Standard errors clustered at the
birth cohort level. Sample restricted to college educated
women in cities, aged 20-47. Regressions additionally
control for age and an indicator for being married.
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Table A.11: Selection on Other Family Characteristics
HH Size Pr(Mother No. Deg. Med
Works)
Women Aged ≤ 25
Treated x Med. Grads -0.6127 0.0736 -0.1924
(0.3572) (0.0717) (0.2259)
N 2016 1602 2016
Mean DV 5.0 0.05 0.02
District FE Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y
Survey Year FE Y Y Y
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy change on selection along
other family characteristics, estimated using equation 3.1. Analysis of
the selection of overall medical graduates is based on the pre-determined
parental characteristics of single graduates aged 25 or less, at which age
the probability of marriage is still low (31%). In column (1) the out-
come is household size, and in column (2) the probability that a woman’s
mother works. Both as proxies for gender norms in the family, as ex-
plained in Section 5. The outcome in column (3) is the number of other
medical graduates in the family, and is a proxy for occupational networks
in medicine. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort
level. "Treated" women are those exposed to the policy change. Data are
from repeated cross sections of the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and
the sample is of women in cities, aged 20-47, with at least a college de-
gree. All regressions control for age and age2. The coefficients on each of
the own terms are included in the regression but not reported here.
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Table A.12: Selection on Migration Status
Probability(Moved)
(1)
Women aged ≤ 25






Survey Year FE Y
Note: The table reports the effect of the policy
change on the selection on being from a migrant
family estimated using equation 3.1. Analysis of the
selection of overall medical graduates is based on
the pre-determined parental characteristics of single
graduates aged 25 or less, at which age the proba-
bility of marriage is still low (31%). Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level.
"Treated" women are those exposed to the policy
change. Data are from repeated cross sections of
the Labor Force Surveys, 1990-2010, and the sam-
ple is of women in cities, aged 20-47, with at least
a college degree. All regressions control for age and
age2. The coefficients on each of the own terms are
included in the regression but not reported here.
Table A.13: Migrating to a Big or Small City
Pr(Migrated Pr(Migrated
to Large City) to Small City)
(1) (2)
Treated x Med. Grads 0.1364∗∗∗ -0.1425
(0.0448) (0.1993)
N 2356 939
District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.41 0.38
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level.
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Table A.14: Years since move for "movers"
Probability(Moved)
<1 year 1-4 years 5-9 years 10+ years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated x Med. Grads -0.0082 0.0080 -0.0043 0.2874∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0176) (0.0630) (0.0855)
N 978 978 978 978
District FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.009 0.017 0.035 0.17
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the birth cohort level.
Table A.15: Effect of Treatment on Marriage Probability for Males
Pr(Married) Pr(Married)
Treated x Med. Grads -0.0528
(0.0313)
Med. Grads -0.0135 -0.0135
(0.0108) (0.0108)
Treated Age[20-25] x Med Grad -0.0229
(0.0324)
Treated Age[26-30] x Med Grad -0.0779
(0.0720)




District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.66 0.66
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions clustered
at the birth cohort level.
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Table A.16: Spousal Educational Attainment for Males
Pr(Marry Pr(Marry Pr(Marry Pr(Marry
Med.) Engg.) Other College) Post Grad)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated x Med. Grads 0.1158∗ -0.0151∗∗ -0.0922∗∗ -0.0058
(0.0622) (0.0062) (0.0430) (0.0462)
Med. Grads 0.1567∗∗∗ 0.0079∗ 0.0206 0.0225
(0.0147) (0.0045) (0.0180) (0.0136)
Observations 12528 12528 12528 12528
R2 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.04
District FE Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 0.019 0.008 0.30 0.088
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars represent significance levels.
Standard errors clustered at the birth cohort level. The outcome in column
(1) is an indicator for marrying a medical graduate, in column (2) an en-
gineering graduate, in column (3) marrying a spouse with another college
degree, and in (4) for marrying a post graduate. All regressions use the full
sample of urban men with at least a college degree aged 20-69.
Table A.17: Work Outcomes Males
Probability(Work) Hours Last Week
Treated x Med. Grads -0.0078 2.1479
(0.0275) (1.5386)




District FE Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y
Mean DV 0.85 46.9
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions clustered
at the birth cohort level.
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Table A.18: Parental Characteristics Males
HHead HH Pr(Mother No. Deg. Pr(Migrated) Pr(HHead
Income Size Works) Med Migrated)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated x Med. Grads 0.0293 -0.5589∗∗ -0.0062 0.0336 -0.4754 0.0509
(0.1809) (0.2416) (0.0293) (0.1026) (0.4367) (0.0716)
N 1198 4119 3294 4119 3049 4114
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars represent significance levels. Standard errors clustered
at the birth cohort level. Cells contain coefficients from ineraction terms.. All regressions use the





Figure A.1: Registrations by Birth Cohort and Cumulative Registra-
tions
The graph plots the female proportion of registrations by birth co-
hort NumberF emaleRegistrationsT otalNumberRegistrations c in black, where c is birth cohort. Fe-
male registrations relative to the cumulative registrations by birth cohort
NumberF emaleRegistrations
T otalNumberRegistrationsUptoCohort c
are plot in purple. Data from the Pakistan Med-
ical and Dental Council website. The medical school admissions policy change was
effective for individuals born in or after 1976.
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Table A.1: Infant Mortality Post-Reform
Infant
Alive Died in Hospital





Mean DV 0.89 0.17
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at the DHS cluster level. * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***
p<.01. The outcome is the likelihood of an infant
staying alive in column 1, and being in a hospital
at the time of death in column 2. All regressions
include DHS cluster fixed effects and controls for
the mother’s age, years of education, birth order
and child sex. The sample is of first time mothers





Table A.1: The Effect of Mining Activity on Labor Force Participa-
tion: Basic Regression
Probability(Work)
At least 1 active mine in sample -0.0060
(0.0066)
Number of active mines -0.0032
(0.0029)
Num active mines (most important) -0.0045∗
(0.0025)
Price (most important) -0.0043
(0.0049)
Observations 3770286 1068326 3770286 3756226
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
F 309.4 208.7 307.4 306.2
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05,
*** p<.01. In column 1 the main regressor is an indicator for a kabputen having any
active mine, in column 2 it is the number of active mines, in column 3 the number of
most important mineral active mines, and in column 4 the logarithm of the world price
of the most important mineral. All regressions include year and kabputen FE. Columns
4-6 include controls for age, age2, indicators for education level and being married. The
data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with
active mines at some point in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
163
Table A.2: The Effect of Mining Activity on Monthly Incomes: Basic
Regression
Log(Monthly Wage)
At least 1 active mine in sample -0.0558
(0.0746)
Number of active mines 0.0646
(0.0451)
Num active mines (most important) 0.0662∗
(0.0399)
Price (most important) 0.1517
(0.2000)
Observations 257567 42641 257567 257204
R2 0.35 0.25 0.35 0.35
F 580.4 124.6 577.3 585.1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the kabputen level. * p<.10, ** p<.05,
*** p<.01. In column 1 the main regressor is an indicator for a kabputen having any
active mine, in column 2 it is the number of active mines, in column 3 the number of
most important mineral active mines, and in column 4 the logarithm of the world price
of the most important mineral. All regressions include year and kabputen FE. Columns
4-6 include controls for age, age2, indicators for education level and being married. The
data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6 million observations), 26 with
active mines at some point in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Table A.3: The Effect of Mining Activity on Working by Educational Attainment and Sector
Probability(Work)
Highest Education Level Primary Junior High Senior High Post-Secondary
Mining
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.0012 0.0044 -0.0016 -0.0050
(0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0034)
Observations 67884 40310 33160 6509
R2 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05
F 2.9 1.0 1.7 1.6
Agriculture
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0112∗∗ -0.0049 0.0076 -0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0051)
Observations 67884 40310 33160 6509
R2 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.03
F 8.2 7.5 3.7 1.9
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants
Num. active mines x log(price) -0.0042 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Observations 67884 40310 33160 6509
R2 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03
F 4.7 4.6 3.3 2.8
Public Administration
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0007∗ 0.0000 -0.0119∗∗ 0.0077
(0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0055) (0.0092)
Observations 67884 40310 33160 6509
R2 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08
F 4.3 5.0 6.4 9.6
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. All regressions include year and kabputen FE.
Standard errors clustered at the kabputen level. Data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 kabputen (6
million observations), 26 with active mines at some point in the sample and 71 with active or inactive mines.
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Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0094 -0.0054 0.0088
(0.0233) (0.0103) (0.0099)
Observations 28552 254494 139432
R2 0.43 0.31 0.24
F 73.6 287.5 695.5
Women
Num. active mines x log(price) 0.0407 -0.0183 0.0064
(0.0278) (0.0132) (0.0083)
Observations 2520 84266 119504
R2 0.55 0.37 0.20
F 16.3 201.5 580.9
Mean DV 0.39 0.28 0.28
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. All regres-
sions include year and district FE. Standard errors clustered at the district
level. Data sample extends from 1998-2011, with 316 district (6 million
observations), 26 with active mines at some point in the sample and 71
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